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Abstract 
The low unemployment rates traditionally enjoyed by Sweden have often been attrib-
uted to the country’s extensive system of active labour market programmes, which 
have thus often been regarded as a model for other countries to emulate. The paper 
investigates the presence of short- and long-term treatment effects on a number of 
outcomes, including employment and unemployment benefit collection. Special atten-
tion is devoted to subsequent outcomes experienced by former participants, in particu-
lar to their job attachment and their performance should they fall back into unem-
ployment. Finally, the distinctive feature of the Swedish labour market policy, 
whereby participation in programmes renews eligibility to generous unemployment 
compensation, is investigated in relation to the incentives it is likely to create to keep 
cycling between compensated unemployment spells and programme participation. The 
approach used is propensity score matching, with some additional analyses trying to 
account for a partially unobserved outcome variable due to misclassification problems 
in the data. Joining a programme as opposed to waiting longer in open unemployment 
appears on average to have a positive dynamic effect on participants’ employment 
rates. The overall findings indicate however that the human capital-enhancing compo-
nent of the programmes may not always be strong enough to outcompete the work dis-
incentives provided by the system. Furthermore, even when cycling has been ruled out 
by focusing on individuals observed to exit their unemployment spell, programmes are 
found to have no effect on any of the outcomes considered. 
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By European standards, Sweden has traditionally enjoyed low unemployment 
rates. The ‘Swedish model’ with its extensive offer of various labour market 
programmes has been credited with this outcome by many observers (e.g. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). Quite interestingly, in the UK a pro-
gramme (the ‘New Deal’) sharing some of the features of the Swedish set-up 
has recently been introduced (April 1998).  
The beginning of the 1990s has however witnessed a dramatic change in the 
labour market situation in Sweden, whose economy was brought to its deepest 
economic slump in more than 50 years. Unemployment swiftly reached un-
precedented levels, more than quadrupling between 1990 and 1993 (cf. Figure 
1.1), and this despite a further expansion in the offer of labour market pro-
grammes. Concomitantly, the budget has come under increasing pressure; in 
1993 Sweden’s budget deficit at 13% of GDP is among the highest in the West-
ern world, while the national debt has reached 80% of GDP. 
 
Figure 1.1  Swedish total unemployment, broken into open unemployment and 























Sources: Open unemployment rate from the Labour Force Survey (LFS); programme rate as the number of 
participants from the National Labour Market Board (AMS) register over the labour force from LFS. 
 
Labour market programmes have represented a large investment for the 
Swedish government, which spends over 3% of GNP on such measures, com- 4
pared to 2.1% in Germany and 0.4% in the US (Forslund and Krueger, 1995, 
Table 1). Programmes for the unemployed are a large-scale undertaking; in 
1997, for instance, 191,000 individuals – representing 4.5% of the labour force 
– participated on average in such programmes (excluding measures for the dis-
abled). In each month of the same year, 37,000 individuals, or 10% of the total 
yearly stock of unemployed, were enrolled in the most expensive programme, 
labour market training.  
In the presence of both rising unemployment and expanding budget deficit, 
the justifiability of the expense of the Swedish labour market programmes 
hinges on the assessment of their actual effectiveness.
3 Secondly, it may well be 
that the bundle of measures that was effective in tackling a certain kind of un-
employment is no longer so successful in a different environment. Since the un-
derlying causes of unemployment are diverse and most likely to vary among 
target groups, geographical regions as well as over time (see Schmidt, 2000), 
the developments in the last decade seem to cast doubts as to the universal cure-
all nature of the ‘Swedish model’.  
Considering the importance of these issues, several authors have in the past 
lamented the absence of an adequate microeconometric literature assessing the 
impacts of the Swedish system.
4 The recently established Swedish Office of La-
bour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU), however, has increasingly carried out 
research in this as well as wider directions – examples include Carling and 
Gustafson (1999) for self-employment subsidies versus subsidised jobs, Melk-
ersson (1999a, b) for programmes targeted at the disabled, Larsson (2000) for 
youth programmes, Johansson and Martinson (2000) for two types of labour 
market training programmes, and Carling and Richardson (2001) for the relative 
efficiency of eight of the Swedish programmes; Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) 
                                                 
3 Ideally, even if positive net (social) benefits from the programmes were found, one would 
have to show that this was the best outcome achievable from the resources invested. 
4 For a macroeconomic evaluation of the Swedish programmes, see Forslund and Krueger 
(1995); Forslund and Kolm (2000) investigate the effects of the Swedish programmes on 
wage pressure.  5
look at displacement effects of the programmes, while Lundin and Skedinger 
(2000) investigate the effects of the degree of decentralisation on programme 
administration. 
Further general interest in the Swedish case arises from a few features of the 
institutional set-up which raise some methodological issues not previously ad-
dressed in the typical US programme evaluation literature.
5 
As it will be more fully described in the next section, in Sweden the active 
and passive components of the labour market policy are closely intertwined: un-
employed workers who participate in a programme effectively renew their eligi-
bility to generous unemployment compensation. Since individuals may thus 
have an incentive to select into the programmes just to renew their benefits, 
programmes may end up reinforcing the work disincentive associated with the 
unemployment insurance system. 
In a context where individuals can potentially participate in a dozen of dif-
ferent programmes, the object of the evaluation – the ‘treatment’ itself – is not 
an immediate choice. Furthermore, any unemployed who registers at an em-
ployment office can potentially become a participant. In fact, it may be argued 
that those who are not observed to go on a programme before finding a job have 
not been treated because they have waited long enough to find a job. In addi-
tion, since our data record individual histories, an individual may enter a pro-
gramme in a later registration spell, all of which makes the selection of the 
‘group of non-participants’ not as straightforward as in the typical evaluation of 
a given programme.  
These difficulties are compounded by the fact that all the programmes under 
scrutiny are ongoing programmes, which take place continuously over time. In-
dividually differing starting dates make the time before and after the pro-
gramme well defined only for a given participant. 
                                                 
5 Some Western European countries’ labour market programmes share a few of the Swedish 
features (in particular, a variety of ongoing measures); see in particular the recent work by 
Lechner (e.g. 1996, 1999a, 1999b) and Gerfin and Lechner (2000).  6
The extremely rich dataset being used in the evaluation of the Swedish pro-
grammes may finally give rise to additional general interest in the results. Often 
in the literature programme effects are evaluated at a given – and arbitrary – 
point in time (e.g. on the last observation day, or after a year). By contrast, be-
ing able to follow up individuals for a relatively long time (up to six years) al-
lows us to capture dynamic effects, including both short and long-term ones. In 
addition, the available data allows us to identify a larger number of destination 
states and outcomes than generally available, so that different questions con-
cerning programme effectiveness may be asked: 
-  Are programmes effective in helping participants find a job faster?  
-  Are programmes suited to endow them with skills and good working habits 
to keep a job longer? 
-  Do programmes foster the further acquisition of human capital in the regular 
education system? 
-  Do programmes lead to further (repeated) participation in subsequent pro-
grammes?  
-  Have programmes taught former participants how to deal more effectively 
with a new unemployment experience? 
-  Do programmes induce participants to start cycling between compensated 
unemployment and eligibility-renewing programme spells? 
 
Before turning in Section 5 to the answers to these and other questions, the 
next section outlines the Swedish labour market policy in some detail, while 
Section 3 describes how the data we use captures such an institutional frame-
work. Section 4 expounds the evaluation problem, while the relevant parts of 
Section 5 explain how the statistical matching techniques have been adapted to 
the Swedish context. Subsection 5.2.4 additionally tries to address the problem 
of a partly unobserved outcome variable arising from attrition/misclassification 
problems in the available database. Section 6 looks at unemployment- 7




2.  The Swedish labour market policy 
The Swedish labour market policy has two components: a benefit system that 
supports individuals while unemployed and various active labour market pro-
grammes offered in order to improve the opportunities of unemployed workers.  
Unemployment compensation is provided in two forms, the most important 
one being unemployment insurance (UI). UI benefits are very generous – the 
income-related daily compensation is 80% of the previous wage
6 – and are 
available for a long duration – 60 calendar weeks, more than twice the maxi-
mum duration of unemployment benefits in the US. 
An (even part-time) unemployed person registered at a public employment 
office and actively searching for a job is eligible for unemployment benefits if 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
1.  membership condition: the claimant must have paid the (almost negligible) 
membership fees to the UI fund for at least 12 months prior to the claim;  
2. work condition: the claimant must have been working for at least five 
months during the twelve months preceding the current unemployment spell. 
Until 1996, a 5-month participation in practically any labour market pro-
gramme would count as employment in allowing participants to become eli-
gible for their first time. 
3.  an offer of ‘suitable’ work – or of a labour market programme – must be ac-
cepted; refusal to accept a job/programme might lead to expulsion from 
compensation. 
                                                 
6 This maximum level of compensation has changed a few times during the 1990s; from 90% 
of the previous wage, it was reduced to 80% in July 1993, then further to 75% in January 
1996, before being restored to 80% in September 1997. Note however that the system has a 
ceiling in terms of the amount of daily compensation, so that formerly high-wage unemployed 
individuals benefit from a lower compensation rate.  8
The second form of unemployment compensation is cash labour market assis-
tance (KAS). This supplementary compensation system has been mainly de-
signed for new entrants in the labour market who usually are not members of 
any UI fund. Daily taxable benefits are significantly lower than UI (around 
half) and are paid out for half the UI period (30 calendar weeks)
7 and claimants 
are subject to a work condition similar to the one for UI, which can however be 
replaced by the education condition of having finished at least one year of 
school in excess of the nine compulsory ones. 
Turning now to the labour market programmes, their stated overall purpose is 
to prevent long periods out of regular employment and to integrate unemployed 
and economically disadvantaged individuals into the labour force. There are 
various kinds of programmes available, ranging from labour market retraining 
to public sector employment such as relief work, to subsidised jobs, trainee re-
placement schemes, work experience schemes and job introduction projects, to 
programmes targeted at specific groups, such as a variety of special ‘youth 
measures’, special measures targeted at the disabled, or self-employment and 
relocation grants. The different types of programmes may thus variously benefit 
participants by either facilitating their job search, augmenting their human capi-
tal with formal teaching or by providing them with job experience, improving 
their working habits or offering a cheap way for employers to screen their pro-
ductivity.  
Most programmes have a maximum duration of six months, though partici-
pants stay on average for around four months. 
The two components of the Swedish labour market policy just outlined – pas-
sive unemployment benefit policy and active labour market programmes – are 
closely linked, in that participation in a labour market programme for five 
months counts as employment and thus qualifies for a renewed spell of unem-
ployment compensation. Thus despite the fact that the period during which an 
                                                 
7 The maximum durations reported for both UI and KAS benefits refer to individuals below 55 
years. Claimants aged over 55 are entitled to 90 weeks of UI and 60 weeks of KAS; if aged  9
unemployed job-seeker can receive unemployment benefits is fixed, it is in fact 
possible to extend it indefinitely by using programme participation as a passport 
to renewed eligibility. 
A peculiar type of ‘programme’ should be mentioned before concluding. This 
‘programme’ does not allow to renew eligibility; in fact, ‘participation’ in it is 
a pre-requisite for collecting unemployment benefits. Such a ‘treatment’ is sim-
ply being registered at an employment office. Registered job-seekers take ad-
vantage of the various employment services offered by the offices, not only in 
terms of the increasingly computerised job information and matching of vacan-
cies to applicants, but also in terms of the so-called job-seeker activities, which 
include search-skill-enhancing activities such as training courses on how to ap-
ply for a job and motivation-raising activities. 
In Sweden nobody is really left ‘untreated’. The treatment status to which 
programme participants will be compared to in the following analyses is thus 
not one of being completely abandoned to fend for oneself, but the baseline 
treatment offered by the employment offices. In conclusion, it is important to 
bear in mind that the effectiveness of the properly defined programmes will be 
assessed against the benchmark of the employment offices’ services. Since job 
services are expected to enhance job search intensity and efficiency rather than 
human capital or working habits, it might for instance be that this ‘no-
treatment’ is more effective than standard programmes in reducing unemploy-
ment duration, but less in prolonging job retention. Finally, if such job services 
turn out to be more effective than standard programmes, they will most likely 
be more cost-effective as well (cf. Figure 2.1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
over 60, to 90 weeks of KAS.  10








Note: The cost of the programmes and that for job placement are not directly comparable, 
since some of the programmes pay participants an allowance equivalent to the unemployment 
cash benefits the individual would have received as openly unemployed. 
 
 
3.  Data and sample selection 
The dataset we have constructed to capture the institutional framework de-
scribed in the previous section is the result of combining two main sources, 
which reflect the programme component (Händel) and the benefit component 
(Akstat) of the labour market policy. 
Händel is the unemployment register, of which the various databases contain 
information on all unemployed individuals registered at the public employment 
offices. This register-based longitudinal event history dataset, available from 
1991, provides for each individual the start and end date of registration spells, 
and within these, of ‘open’ unemployment spells and programme participation 
spells. In addition to individual labour market status information over time, the 
data provide important personal characteristics of the job-seekers, as well as of 
the occupation they are looking for. We have used the information regarding the 
reason for ending the registration spell (e.g. obtained employment, gone on 
regular education or left the workforce) to impute the labour market status of 
the individual between registration periods.
8 
                                                 
8 Following Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (1999) unemployment spells durations have been 
slightly adjusted in order to disregard short interruptions of the spells. Two adjacent unem- 11
Akstat originates from the unemployment insurance funds and provides in-
formation on individuals entitled to UI benefits or KAS. This dataset, available 
from 1994, includes information on the amount and type of compensation paid 
out to the individual, as well as on previous earnings and working hours. 
The end result is a very large and comprehensive dataset of 150,000 indi-
viduals who first
9 register in 1994 and are then followed until the end of No-
vember 1999.  
Unemployment individuals entitled to compensation are required to be regis-
tered at a public employment office in order to collect their benefits. Further-
more, the employment offices have a monopoly over the active labour market 
programmes, so that any individual intending to participate needs to register. In 
fact, over 90% of the unemployed do register at an employment office
10, making 
our employment register-based dataset quite representative of the population of 
interest. 
The lives of these individuals have been divided into adjacent sub-periods in 
which they are characterised by a different labour market category (e.g. em-
ployed, unemployed, part-time unemployed, temporary employed, on relief 
work, on a labour market training programme, etc.). In addition to being ex-
tremely rich in providing information (to the day) about the duration of stay in a 
labour market category, the final dataset includes the necessary array of demo-
graphic and human capital variables together with information on unemploy-
ment benefit recipiency and type of entitlement. 
From the original data set, a subset of 116,130 individuals has been selected 
who, in addition of first entering the employment offices in the same calendar 
year, 1994 (when unemployment was still at its highest – cf. Figure 1.1), regis-
                                                                                                                                                     
ployment spells separated by a short (no longer than 7 days) break have been merged into one 
long spell. A similar adjustment has been made when an individual’s first period of registra-
tion at the employment office is a short non-unemployment spell immediately followed by an 
unemployment spell. 
9 Strictly speaking, one cannot exclude that our individuals have had contact with the unem-
ployment office before August 1991, date when Händel starts.  12
ter as openly unemployed. In particular, given that the main purpose of the pro-
grammes is to enhance the re-employability of the unemployed, we exclude in-
dividuals registering as employed or directly entering as programme partici-
pants. 





4.  The evaluation problem and statistical matching 
The prototypical evaluation problem can be framed within the potential-
outcome approach
12, a framework which fruitfully highlights the definition of 
treatment effects and clarifies the conditions needed to identify them.
13  
We are interested in evaluating the causal effect of a treatment of interest 
(treatment 1), relative to another treatment (treatment 0), on the outcome or re-
sponse variable Y, which is experienced by units in the population of interest. It 
is thus essential that each unit be potentially exposable to any of the two treat-
ments. For example, an evaluator may want to assess the causal effect of a pol-
icy variable such as participation in a programme, relative to no participation, 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 From a validation study by Statistics Sweden, quoted in Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holm-
lund (1996, Footnote 7). 
11 In the full dataset, over 18,000 individuals were observed to experience at least one nega-
tive duration (i.e. where the exit date from the spell comes before the entry date), resulting in 
21,200 negative spells. After correcting what clearly appeared to be mistakes (in particular, 
when the negative spell has exactly the same number of days as the preceding spell as well as 
having a preceding category equal to the following), 8,800 negative spells are left. Following 
a suggestion by Katarina Richardson, the remaining 8,000 individuals involved have been 
kept in the sample after having deleted their spells from one spell before the negative one 
onwards. 
12 Though the concepts behind the framework have been around since Fisher (1935) and Ney-
man (1935), Rubin (1974) formally applied them to the study of causation; see however also 
the work by Roy (1951) and Quandt (1972). 
13  Standard references in the evaluation literature include the comprehensive work by 
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1998), as well as Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, Ichi-
mura,  and Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983, 1985).  13
on the employment rate experienced at a given time by individuals in the unem-
ployed population. 
Let Y1 be the outcome that would result if the individual were exposed to the 
treatment of interest (treatment 1) and Y0 the outcome that would result if the 
same individual received treatment 0. Let us denote the binary indicator of the 
treatment actually received as D∈ {0, 1}.  For a given individual i, the actually 
observed outcome is then Yi = Y0i + Di (Y1i – Y0i). To complete the notation, let 
X be the set of attributes (i.e. characteristics that are not affected by the treat-
ment, such as all time-invariant characteristics of the individuals, as well as 
pre-exposure variables).  
It is useful to highlight that already at this very general stage an assumption 
has to be made. The stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
14 requires 
that an individual’s potential outcomes depend only on his own participation, 
not on the treatment status of other individuals in the population (thus ruling 
out cross-effects or general equilibrium effects) and that whether an individual 
participates or not does not depend on the participation decisions of others (e.g. 
thus excluding peer effects in the participation decision).
15 
The effect of treatment 1 on unit i as measured by Y and relative to treatment 
0 (in the following the treatment effect for a single unit i) is Y1i–Y0i, the differ-
ence between the unit’s potential outcome were it exposed to treatment 1 and 
the unit’s potential outcome were it to receive treatment 0.  
Since no unit can be in two different states at the same time, so that either Y1i 
or Y0i is missing for each i, at the core of the evaluation problem is the attempt 
to estimate missing data: the ‘Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference’ makes 
                                                 
14  SUTVA was first expressed by Rubin (1980) and further discussed in Rubin (1986) and 
Holland (1986b). SUTVA in causal effects studies is a more general version of the assump-
tion of no interference between units in experimental studies (Cox, 1958) or of stable re-
sponse in surveys (Rubin, 1987). 
15 SUTVA is in fact the assumption that the model’s representation of outcomes is adequate, 
that is that Yti – the observed outcome of unit i if unit i is exposed to treatment t – only de- 14
it impossible to observe the individual treatment effect and thus to make causal 
inference without making generally untestable assumptions (Holland, 1986a).  
Whether inferences are drawn from experimental or observational data, ex-
tremely strong assumptions are needed to identify the individual treatment ef-
fect
16 or other parameters depending on the joint distribution of Y1i and Y0i. By 
contrast, the average treatment effect at the population, or at a sub-population, 
level can be identified under generally less stringent assumptions (some of 
which will be highlighted shortly). Parameters that only depend on the marginal 
distributions of Y1i and Y0i are the ‘average treatment effect’ E(Y1–Y0), the ‘av-
erage treatment effect on the non-treated’ E(Y1–Y0|D=0) and the ‘average 
treatment effect on the treated’ E(Y1–Y0|D=1). The last parameter is the one re-
ceiving most attention in the evaluation literature and will be the focus of the 
following discussion
17 as well as the object of evaluation in the empirical part 
(as explained in Section 5.1, in Sweden all (registered) unemployed individuals 
potentially belong to the treatment group). In our case, assessing the expected 
treatment effect for those individuals actually observed to receive the treatment 
thus amounts to addressing the question of how the post-programme outcome of 
unemployed workers participating in a Swedish programme compares to how 
they would have fared had they not taken part in the programme, on average.  
For participants we do observe Y1, the outcome after the treatment, so that 
the average observed outcome for participants is an unbiased estimate of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
pends on i and t (in particular, not on what treatments other units receive nor on the mecha-
nism assigning treatment t to unit i) and that Di only depends on i. 
16 Examples include the unit homogeneity assumption (Y1i=Y1j and Y0i= Y0j for two units i and 
j) or the assumption (implied by the former) of a homogeneous treatment effect across the 
population (additivity assumption). Another assumption, mainly relevant to physical experi-
ments, consists of constancy of response to treatment 0 over time together with the effect of 
treatment 0 and the measurement process not affecting the value of Y1i, so that unit i may be 
sequentially exposed to treatment 0 and then to treatment 1, each time measuring the result-
ing Yi (Holland, 1986a). 
17 For the average effect on the non-treated, a symmetric procedure applies; while the average 
treatment effect is simply a weighted average of the other two parameters. In the special case 
where the effect of the treatment is homogeneous among individuals, the three effects would 
coincide.  15
first component of the effect of treatment on the treated, E(Y1|D=1). We do not 
however observe participants’ Y0, the outcome they would have experienced had 
they not participated. To overcome the fundamental problem of causal infer-
ence, the counterfactual E(Y0|D=1) needs to be somehow constructed on the ba-
sis of some usually untestable identifying assumptions that justify the use of the 
observed pairs (Y1, D=1), (Y0, D=0). 
A general issue is that treated individuals may not be a random sample of the 
population, but they may receive treatment on the basis of characteristics which 
also influence their outcomes. For example, if there is cream-skimming by pro-
gramme officers – trying to pick out the best candidates for training – , or if the 
most able, determined and motivated individuals manage to get into the pro-
grammes, participants are of better quality than the rest, and would have done 
well anyway, resulting in an over-estimate the impact of the programme.  Since 
one wants to estimate returns from participating in a programme which are not 
attributed to the composition of the unemployed workers taking these pro-
grammes, E(Y1|D=1) – E(Y0|D=0) would in general be biased for the effect of 
treatment on the treated.
18 
An exception is when the independence assumption Y0 ⊥  D can credibly be 
invoked. This is in particular the case of a randomised experiment, where ran-
dom assignment of individuals to treatment ensures that potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment status. Since now E(Y0|D=1) = E(Y0|D=0) = 
E(Y|D=0), the treatment effect can consistently be estimated by the difference 
between the observed mean of the outcome variable in the treatment group and 
the observed mean in the no-treatment group.  
When randomised experiments are not available, as in the present evaluation 
of the Swedish programmes, other estimators have to be devised, relying on ap-
propriate identifying assumptions.  
                                                 
18 Holland (1986a) refers to it as the prima facie causal effect – in general an associational 
parameter for the joint distribution of the observable pair (Y, D).  16
One approach to construct a suitable comparison group is based on statistical 
matching. Matching estimators try to mimic an experiment by choosing a com-
parison group from all non-participants such that the selected group is as simi-
lar as possible to the treatment group in terms of their observable characteris-
tics. Simple matching estimators, for instance, pair each treated unit to an ob-
servably similar non-treated unit; smoothed versions
19 associate to the outcome 
Yi of treated unit i a ‘matched’ outcome given by a weighted average of the out-
come of all non-treated units (within the common support), where the weight 
given to non-treated unit j is in proportion to the closeness of the observables of 
i and j. 
When the relevant differences between any two individuals are captured in 
their observable attributes (where ‘relevance’ is in terms of their potential out-
comes), matching methods can yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment im-
pact. This underlying identifying assumption, henceforth CIA (‘conditional in-
dependence assumption’, also called ‘ignorable treatment assignment’ or ‘selec-
tion on observables’) requires the evaluator to have access to a set of condition-
ing observed attributes X such that, for a given value of the X vector, the distri-
bution of the (counterfactual) outcome Y0 in the treated group is the same as the 
(observed) distribution of Y0 in the non-treated group, in symbols:  
Y0 ⊥  D | X    
20 
In other words, what the CIA requires is that the finally chosen group of 
matched controls – i.e. conditional on the X’s used to match and select them – 
does not differ from the group of treated by any variable which is systemati-
cally linked to the non-participation outcome Y0. This allows the use of matched 
non-participants to measure what participants would have fared, on average, had 
they not participated.  
                                                 
19 See in particular the kernel-based matching estimator proposed by Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1997, 1998) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998).  17
The plausibility of CIA needs to be argued on a case-by-case basis, with ac-
count being taken of the informational richness of the available dataset (i.e. X) 
and the institutional set-up where selection into the treatment takes place. In 
particular, the set of the X’s should contain all the variables that are thought to 
simultaneously influence both participation and outcomes in the absence of par-
ticipation. A discussion of how likely the basic matching assumption is to be 
fulfilled in our case is postponed to the first part of Section 5.2.2. 
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The conditional treatment effect is estimated by taking the difference of the 
average observed outcome in the two groups conditioning on X; averaging over 
X in the treated (D=1) group then yields the estimated treatment effect. 
For the matching procedure to have empirical content, it is also required that 
P{D=1|X}<1  over the set of X values where we seek to make a comparison, 
which guarantees that all treated individuals have a counterpart in the non-
treated population for each X for which we seek to make a comparison.
21 In par-
ticular, if there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for the 
treated and non-treated groups, matching has to be performed over the common 
support region; the estimated treatment effect has then to be redefined as the 
mean treatment effect for those treated falling within the common support. Note 
                                                                                                                                                     
20 For the average effect of treatment on the treated, the weaker version of the CIA in terms of 
conditional mean independence suffices: E(Y0 | X, D=1) = E(Y0  | X, D=0). For the average 
effect of the non-treated, either version of the CIA would be in terms of Y1. 
21 When object of the evaluation is the effect of treatment on the non-treated, we need to as-
sume that 0<P{D=1|X}, so that a match can be found for all D=0 units.  18
that if the treatment effect varies among individuals, restricting to the common 
subset may actually change the parameter being estimated.
22 
A practical problem in implementation arises if the X’s are highly dimen-
sional, and especially if they contain continuous variables (which would have to 
be discretised). In this case, when performing matching the number of observa-
tions in each cell can get very small, and there may be empty cells left.
23 A very 
useful variable in this respect is the so-called propensity score   
e(x)≡ Pr{D=1|X=x} – the non-trivial (due to the aforementioned condition) con-
ditional probability of participation given a vector of observed characteristics x. 
As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show, by definition treatment and non-
treatment observations with the same value of the propensity score have the 
same distribution of the full vector of regressors X (the balancing property of 
the propensity score: X ⊥  D | e(X)). It is thus sufficient to match exactly on the 
propensity score – a single variable on the unit interval – to obtain the same 
probability distribution of X for treated and non-treated individuals in matched 
samples.  
Under CIA and the condition that 0<e(X)<1 over  ~ Χ :   
Y0 ⊥  D | e(X) for X in  ~ Χ  
Under the two matching assumptions, a matched sample at each propensity 
score e(X) is thus equivalent to a random sample: individuals with the same 
value of e(X) but a different treatment status can act as controls for each other, 
so that at any value of e(X), the difference between the treatment and the non-
treatment averages is an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect at 
                                                 
22  An advantage of social experiments is that since randomisation generates a comparison 
group for each X in the population of the treated, the average effect of the programme can be 
estimated over the entire support. By contrast, under the CIA matching generates a compari-
son group, but only for those X values that satisfy 0<Prob{D=1|X}<1. 
23 With a binary treatment and K binary covariates (i.e. dummy variables), the minimum sam-
ple size for each cell having at least one treated and one control is 2• 2
k = 2
k+1.  19
that value of e(X).
24 The estimate of matching can thus be thought of as a 
weighted average of the estimates from many mini random experiments at dif-
ferent values of e(X). 
Possibly the main attraction of the matching method is its non-parametric na-
ture, which avoids the need to define a specific form for the outcome equation, 
selection process or unobservables in either equation. In practice, though, the 
propensity score needs to be estimated and this is generally done parametri-
cally. Even so, the semi-parametric method does not rely on distributional as-
sumptions nor does it impose functional forms restrictions in the outcome equa-
tion (while e.g. least squares adjustments heavily rely on linearity, which is 
usually justified neither by economic theory nor by the data
25). In addition, het-
erogeneous individual treatment effects are allowed for, so that no assumption 
of a constant additive treatment effect for different individuals is required. Fi-
nally, in contrast to standard parametric methods, matching estimators highlight 
the problem of common support.
26 In fact, the absence of good overlap may in 
general cast doubts as to the robustness of traditional methods relying on func-
tional form to extrapolate outside the common support. 
In a model-free environment, matching is thus able to eliminate two of the 
three selection-bias sources identified by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 
(1998): the bias due to the difference in the supports of X in the treated and 
control groups (failure of the common support condition) and the bias due to the 
                                                 
24 This result holds for a more general ‘balancing score’ b(X), a function of X such that 
X⊥ D|b(X).  The finest and most trivial balancing score is X itself, while the propensity score 
is the coarsest one. 
25 One could however allow for more flexible specifications by including higher-order and 
interaction terms. 
26  Nearest-neighbour matching estimators – provided not too ‘tolerant’ – automatically use 
the observations within the common support of X (or of e(X)), while good practice (see 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998)) 
requires the analyst to perform kernel-based matching only over the region of common sup-
port.  20




5.  Matching  in  the  Swedish  institutional set-up 
5.1  Treated and non-treated in Sweden and other key choices 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Swedish institutional set-up poses a few 
interesting methodological issues which have to be resolved before applying 
matching techniques. 
Object of our evaluation is a system with a wide array of different ongoing 
programmes, which take place continuously over time and are open to all regis-
tered job-seekers; unemployed individuals in turn can – and in fact often do – 
register repeatedly, and they can be treated at different times during their ob-
served unemployment history. In such a context, several choices have to be 
taken, including how to actually define the treatments, as well as the treated and 
the non-treated individuals. Only then will one be able to formulate meaningful 
causal questions.
28 
As to the choice of units, we will look at individuals registering as unem-
ployed for their first time. 
As to the definition of the treatments, the focus is accordingly on the first 
treatment individuals may receive within their first registration as unemployed, 
so that any subsequent programme participation is viewed as an outcome of that 
first treatment. Furthermore, the Swedish active labour market policy is consid-
ered in its totality: the aim of the present study is to shed some light on the 
overall effectiveness of the Swedish unemployment system, a system compris-
                                                 
27 The remaining source of bias is the one due to selection on unobservables. Arguing its im-
portance amounts to arguing the inadequacy of CIA for a particular problem; as noted above, 
this should be done in relation to the richness of the available observables (i.e. data) in con-
nection to the selection/outcome processes. 
28 It is certainly true what Holland (1986b, p.969) remarks: “it is usually easy to make an 
identification of U, K and Y with units, treatments and a response variable in a randomised 
experiment, but complex observational studies can provide cases in which reasonable people 
might disagree as to the proper identification of the elements of the model.”  21
ing both a collection of different types of programmes and a closely intertwined 
unemployment benefit component. All the various types of programmes are thus 
aggregated into one ‘programme’.
29 Treatment 1 is thus any programme in 
which a first-time unemployed can participate. The definition of treatment 0 is 
however considerably less straightforward.
30  
Generally speaking, in Sweden nobody decides never to join any programme. 
By contrast, everyone will – in principle – be treated at some time, if he is un-
employed long enough. In fact, bringing this reasoning to its limit, one could 
argue that the reason an unemployed individual has not been observed to go on 
a programme is because he has found a job (before). 
In such a context, two sets of analyses will be pursued, each one looking at a 
different subgroup of individuals and asking a different type of question. 
We first start by considering individuals entering unemployment (for their 
first time). Once registered, unemployed job-seekers (and programme officers) 
are likely to take their decisions sequentially over time in unemployment, so 
that the choice open to them is not whether to participate or not to participate at 
all, but whether to participate now or not to participate for now. An unemployed 
individual may decide not to participate for now, knowing that he will be able 
to join a programme later on. For those de-registering before being treated, the 
waiting choice has proved successful. When looking at individuals entering un-
employment, the effect one can thus try to assess in such an institutional con-
text concerns the possible benefits from joining compared to waiting (that is, of 
actual participation compared to postponing the participation decision). The ef-
fect of the joining decision will be evaluated with respect to a series of out-
comes, ranging from the duration of the first unemployment experience (Section 
5.2.6), to various labour market states of individuals over time (the differential 
probabilities of unemployment, of employment, of subsequent programme par-
ticipation, of non-participation including in particular further studies, of benefit 
                                                 
29 Looking at the impact of different programmes is left to future work.  22
collection and of cycling between unemployment compensation and programmes 
for up to five years from the treatment – Section 5.2.3 – 5.2.5).  
The focus of the second set of analyses will be on subsequent outcomes ex-
perienced by individuals who have been observed to follow a given path. Condi-
tioning on past outcomes, in particular on exit from the unemployment system, 
allows one to look at the impact of actual programme participation compared to 
actual non-participation. In particular, we will be able to address the effective-
ness of previous programme participation in helping employed individuals keep 
their jobs longer (5.3.1), or in helping newly unemployed individuals exit their 
new unemployment spell faster (5.3.2). 
A final difficulty arises from the fact that we are considering a system of on-
going programmes, taking place continuously over time and with individually 
differing starting dates (both in calendar terms and in relative terms, i.e. in 
terms of time since registration). This implies that potentially important vari-
ables related to the distance in time to the beginning of the programme are not 
defined for the non-treated group and thus cannot be included in the estimation 
of the propensity score. Probably the most crucial of these variables is the un-
employment duration prior to entering a programme.
31  
First of all, there is a question of ‘common support’: one needs to be unem-
ployed to be enrolled into a programme, so all potential comparisons to a 
treated individuals should have at least reached a stage where they could have 
joined the programme.  
Secondly, elapsed unemployment duration is likely to capture some important 
unobservables; since average unobserved ‘ability’ (standing for any unobserved 
skill linked to an individual’s ability to exit an unemployment spell) declines 
over unemployment duration, a participant’s observed time spent in unemploy-
                                                                                                                                                     
30 The discussion of an absent 'non-treatment' group was initiated by Carling and Larsson 
(2000a, b). 
31 The importance of recent unemployment histories (even more than earnings dynamics) as a 
variable to be controlled for has been highlighted in particular by Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1997).  23
ment before entering a programme reveals a bound on his expected unobserved 
ability. One has thus to make sure that he is paired to a non-treated who has 
spent in unemployment at least the time it took the participant to join the pro-
gramme.  
Thirdly, there are some (albeit loose) regulations, as well as some particular 
incentives which link elapsed unemployment duration to programme participa-
tion; some programmes for instance formally require 4 months of open unem-
ployment prior to enrolment, while approaching unemployment benefit exhaus-
tion may make individuals more likely to enter a programme. Unemployment 
duration is thus an important X variable for explaining not only subsequent out-
comes as discussed above, but also the participation decision (D=1). 
Finally, in the presence of individually differing starting dates one needs to 
set a relative time scale to begin measuring the effect of the programme. 
Matched non-participants need to be assigned a hypothetical unemployment du-
ration prior to the programme, which splits their observed unemployment dura-
tion into a pre-programme attribute and an outcome sub-spell. The interrupted 
unemployment duration of their respective matched participants (i.e. their time 
to the programme) would seem an obvious candidate. 
Ideally, we would then match on T
1, the duration of the first unemployment 
spell interrupted by the programme. The obvious problem is that T
1 for the non-
treated is an unobserved counterfactual (i.e. their waiting time before the start 
of a programme had they entered one) and it thus cannot be included in the es-
timation of the propensity score.  
Still, for the reasons expounded above, it is essential to impose that all com-
parison individuals eligible to be matched to a given treated unemployed for T
1 
before entering the programme have reached an unemployment duration of at 
least T
1: this ensures that both treated and control have a ‘complete’
32 unem-
ployment duration T
0 at least as long as
 T
1. 
                                                 
32 ‘Complete’ refers to the unemployment duration an individual would experience were he 
not to join a programme. T
0 is thus observed for individuals whose unemployment spell ends  24
5.2  The effect of joining versus waiting 
5.2.1  Methodology 
The requirement in terms of unemployment duration can be fulfilled in quite a 
natural way when implementing our version of the average effect of treatment 
on the treated, i.e. the average effect of ‘joining compared to waiting for those 
who join’. 
The causal inference problem we want to address can be formalised as fol-
lows. Let Dε {J,W} denote the treatment indicator, where J stands for joining 
and W for waiting. The response variable is Y(i, D, t), the labour market status 
of individual i at time t if individual i were exposed to treatment D. To simplify 
the notation, in the following the fact that the response is a function of time 
rather than simply a scalar is ignored and the short-hand notation YJ and YW is 
used to denote the potential outcomes corresponding to joining and waiting, re-
spectively.  
The mean effect of treatment on the treated we aim to estimate is the average 
effect, for those observed to join a programme, of joining when they did com-
pared to waiting longer than they have: 
τ  ≡  E(YJ – YW | D=J) 
We proceed by first subdividing this complex problem into a sequence of M 
simpler problems. By discretising unemployment duration, τ  can be written as: 
τ =− = = = =
= ∑EY Y D JT m P rT mD J JW
m
M
(| ,) (| )
1
1
1    
In concrete terms, we stratify our sample by (discretised) unemployment du-
ration. In particular, for each m = 1, …, M we calculate τ m, the effect of treat-
ing an unemployed individual in his m
th  month of unemployment compared to  
                                                                                                                                                     
‘naturally’, i.e. in employment or non-participation (nobody is censored for the full 6-year  
observation period), while T
1 is observed for individuals joining a programme; for the latter, 
we know that T
0≥ T
1.  25
not treating him at least until the end of his m
th month (in other words, com-
pared to waiting at least m months): 
τ m ≡  E(YJm – YWm | Dm=1) 
where {YJm, YWm} is subsequent labour market status (respectively conditional 
on Jm – joining a programme in one’s m
th month – on Wm – waiting longer than 
m months) and Dm = 1 if D=J and T
1=m, i.e. for those joining a programme in 
their m
th month of unemployment. (Note that {D=J} = 
m
M
= 1  {Dm=1}.) 
The form of CIA we require to identify τ m is:   
YWm ⊥  Dm | X=x, T
0≥ m   ( m=1, …, M) 
In words, given X=x and having reached the same duration in unemploy-
ment
33, the distribution of YWm for individuals joining a programme now is the 
same as the one for individuals deciding to wait. Say we observe two individu-
als with the same characteristics and who have reached the same unemployment 
duration, one of which joining a programme now, while the other deciding to 
wait longer. For the control, the waiting decision may prove successful, in the 
sense that he will subsequently find a job or de-register for other reasons. Al-
ternatively, he may later decide – or be forced – to join a programme. What the 
CIA requires in such a context is that the probability distribution of such out-
comes is the same for the observably-similar treated individual had he then de-
cided to wait longer as well.  
The parameter of interest τ  can finally be calculated as a weighted average of 
the τ m’s (weighted according to the observed month of placement (T
1) distribu-
tion of the treated): 
ττ =− = = = = = =
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33 Note that we have in fact succeeded in ensuring that for both  a given treated and his 
matched non-treated, the complete unemployment duration T
0 is larger than T
1(=m).  26
In implementation, we set M=18, so that what we will be looking at is the 
impact of entering a programme within one and a half year of first registration; 
94% of all treated are however observed to enter a programme within such a 
time span. (See the Appendix for the sample sizes of the two sub-groups by un-
employment duration and for a description of the protocol used.) 
This methodology has the rather peculiar feature that in the calculation of the 
overall effect a given treated individual (joining a programme in his m
th month) 
may also act as control (being a potential control for (m-1) groups of treated). 
In fact, the relative time scale, which is implicit in the set-up of the problem 
and central in the way it has been addressed, makes it quite intuitive to think of 




Following this procedure also allows us to assess whether there is a differen-
tial programme impact according to the time the individual has spent in unem-
ployment before joining the programme (T
1). A very interesting group is the one 
observed to enter a programme exactly at benefit exhaustion: does joining a 
programme long before benefit exhaustion have a different effect from pro-
gramme participation ‘just’ to renew eligibility? 
To this respect it is important to underline that we are not looking at the mul-
tiple-treatment version of the problem, so that the M single effects cannot be 
compared between themselves in any causal way. This is because each single 
effect of treatment on the treated pertains to a different group of treated (the 
Jm’s are effectively mutually exclusive) and relates to a different population of 
units (i.e. those still unemployed after m months, of which only smaller and 
smaller subsets are potentially exposable to treatments Jk and Wk with k>m). 
When comparing programme effects by month of entry, then, we shall be not 
                                                 
34 In particular, a given treated individual counts as one treated person, whose contribution 
starts being evaluated at the moment he enters the programme (i.e. from his  T
1) and may 
count as control person for ‘otherwise similar’ treated individuals who have joined a pro-
gramme before him. In this latter case, his outcome represents the waiting counterfactual out- 27
trying to assess E(Y
m – Y
k | D
m=1), i.e. the issue of whether joining a programme 
after m months in unemployment leads these participants to experience better or 
worse outcomes than if they had joined after k months; what we shall assess is 
if the programme effect for those individuals who join a programme after m 
months is better or worse than the programme effect for the k
th-month joiners. 
 
Final methodological considerations 
The type of matching used to select those non-treated to act as controls for 
the treated is nearest-neighbour matching with replacement (and within caliper): 
each participant is matched with replacement to that non-participant with the 
closest propensity score
35; treated individuals for whom a match close ‘enough’ 
has not been found and unmatched non-treated individuals are discarded. 
There is a trade-off between matching quality and variance involved in the 
choice of how many non-treated individuals to match to a single treated indi-
vidual and in the connected issue of whether or not to allow a non-treated to be 
used more than once. The type of matching chosen here focuses on minimising 
bias alone (the large samples available and the size of the effects uncovered 
have essentially dictated this focus). One-to-one matching typically involves an 
efficiency loss, since only the participant and its closest neighbour are used, in-
stead of a larger number of close neighbours. By contrast, when more than one 
comparison unit is assigned to any treated (e.g. in kernel-based matching), the 
variance is reduced but at the possible cost of an increased bias. Similarly, us-
ing the same non-treated individual more than once (matching with replace-
ment) can improve matching quality
36, but it increases the variance, which has 
to be adjusted accordingly: the more times a non-treated observation is used, 
                                                                                                                                                     
come for his matched treated individuals, where evaluation begins when the matched treated 
start their respective programme (i.e. from his matched treated individuals’ T
1’s). 
35 Given that any order-preserving transformation of the propensity score is sufficient to 
matching purposes, the predicted linear index rather than the predicted probability is used, as 
the former allows one to be more discriminating on individuals with predicted probabilities in 
the tails of the distribution.   28
the larger the related standard error of the estimated effect.
37 Ideally, the stan-
dard errors should also adjust for the estimation error in the score. For kernel-
based matching, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) have analytically derived 
the asymptotic distribution for the corresponding estimator of the effect of 
treatment on the treated; for one-to-one matching, though, the common solution 
is to resort to bootstrapped confidence intervals. This is however not pursued 
here, mainly due to the extreme amount of computer time that would be 
needed.
38 The reported confidence bands will thus be too narrow; it is hoped 
though that the considerable sample sizes and the very flexible specifications 
(including all interaction terms) used in estimating the propensity score may 
lessen the understatement of variability due to using the estimated rather than 
the true propensity score.
39 
A final methodological consideration concerns the choice of the origin on the 
relative time scale. Having matched on the precondition that the comparison in-
dividuals have to have been unemployed for at least the number of months it 
took their unemployed treated counterpart to get into the programme, it is quite 
                                                                                                                                                     
36 In their application, Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999) do in fact find the performance of 
simple matching with replacement very satisfactory compared to more complex extensions or 
methods without replacement. 
37 Following Lechner (2000), the variance of the treatment effect at time t is calculated by 
assuming independent observations, fixed weights, homoskedasticity of the outcome variable 
within the treated and within the control groups and that the variance of the outcome does not 
























1 is the number of matched treated present at time t, D
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treated, D
M=0 the matched controls and ω i is the number of times control i has been used, 






38 It takes almost 8 hours to match our 32,000 treated just once.  
39 Again, the effects uncovered are certainly not likely to give rise to debates as to their sig-
nificance – cf. especially Section 5.3.  29
natural (cf. the discussion above) to set the origin t=0 for matched comparisons 
when their respective treated begin their programme.
40 
For the treated, however, the (not obvious) choice affects what treatment is 
and when its effect begins. Should one start to evaluate the performance of the 
treated when they enter or when they exit the programme? The answer largely 
depends on how the time spent on the programme is considered. Participation in 
some programmes requires that the individuals continue job-searching activities 
while participating. The offices too continue to search for them, since partici-
pants are still registered and requested to be ‘at the labour market disposal’. In-
dividuals are also required to drop out of a programme if a ‘suitable’ job is 
found for them. What this implies is that the observed programme duration is 
endogenous. In addition, in the light of the series of timing sub-questions asked 
(what is the effect of entering a programme now), it seems natural to set t=0 for 
the treated too at the time when they begin their programme.  
In the following analyses of Section 5.2 then, treatment 1 is ‘starting/being 
assigned to a programme’, also commonly referred to in the literature as the ‘in-
tention to treat’. The causal effect of a programme starts to work with the be-
ginning of the programme, so that any lock-in effect of the programme is 
viewed as a constituent part of the effect. 
 
5.2.2  Determinants of programme participation 
Selection of unemployed individuals into programmes and available infor-
mation: Can the CIA be justified in our case?  
Ideally, all the variables that influence the participation (‘joining now’) deci-
sion as well as potential ‘waiting longer’ outcomes – that is the outcomes that 
would occur where such decision to be postponed – should be included in the 
estimation of the propensity score. One thus needs to first consider the mecha-
nisms through which individuals join a programme and to then assess whether 
                                                 
40 If a comparison is used more than once, his contribution is repeatedly evaluated using the 
different starting dates of his matched treated counterparts.  30
the available regressors capture all the relevant factors affecting the participa-
tion decision and future potential outcomes. 
Selection mechanism 
In Sweden, the unemployment offices are characterised by decentralisation, 
which gives job officers quite a large degree of freedom, making it quite hard to 
see any clear patterns in the selection into the available programmes. Job-
seekers themselves are however likely to have a considerable degree of influ-
ence; between 45-50 per cent of the participants in work experience schemes, 
work place introduction and labour market training were initiators to the pro-
grammes according to an unpublished Swedish study. Certain features of the 
programmes themselves are also likely to affect individuals' decisions to join 
one. In particular, entitled individuals who are running out of benefits may try 
to participate in programmes allowing them to renew eligibility. It would thus 
appear that information regarding the entitlement status of an individual (UI, 
KAS or not entitled), as well as the time he has already spent in unemployment 
is crucial, in that it affects both incentives to participate at a given time and fu-
ture labour market outcomes. Similarly, factors relating to potential returns 
from participation – e.g. age, previous stock of human capital in terms of both 
specific and general education and specific experience, occupation being 
sought, citizenship – or affecting the opportunity cost or psychological cost of 
participation – such as gender, part-time unemployment status or previous edu-
cation – should also be included in the conditioning set.  
Still, officer selection is also likely to heavily bear on the final decision. The 
Swedish employment service is not limited to just a brokerage function, but it 
also administers both unemployment insurance and selection into programmes. 
For the programmes mentioned above, the job co-ordinators had in fact been 
initiators in about 30-40% of the cases. Also, although in general an unem-
ployed job-seeker must be willing to participate, this may not always apply to 
individuals receiving unemployment compensation; for them, the proposal of a 
programme can be used as a work test, the turning down of which may entail  31
suspension from benefits. Programme administrators often have considerable 
discretion over whom they admit into programmes. For some programmes, in 
particular labour market training, for instance, it may be felt that some officers 
may look at qualifications to cream-skim the most promising candidates.
41 To 
capture this selection by job officers, educational qualifications and entitlement 
status are again critical, with other useful information relating to an overall 
evaluation by the officer of the situation and character of the unemployed job-
seeker – if already part-time employed, if looking for a part-time job, if willing 
to move to another locality, if the required qualification information is missing, 
if judged to be able to take a job immediately, or to be in need of guidance, or 
to be difficult to place. Such individual traits are in fact quite likely to affect 
the joining decision as well as the counterfactual outcomes in terms of subse-
quent participation or employment probability. 
In the light of the selection mechanism just reviewed, the basic matching as-
sumption in our context requires that conditional on all the information ob-
served, the fact that an unemployed individual goes into a programme this 
month while another waits longer is not correlated with the outcome the indi-
vidual joining now would have experienced had he not entered the programme 
for now (in particular in terms of later programme participation and job finding 
probabilities).  
Two issues thus need to be considered: the possibility of anticipatory
42 effects 
in terms of future programme participation and in terms of future employment.  
1. ‘Waiting’ outcome as subsequent programme participation 
The institutional nature of the programme system (a seemingly continuous 
flows of different programmes often on an individual, ad hoc basis) should 
                                                 
41 This is particularly true from 1999 onwards, when a new goal was introduced specifically 
for labour market training aiming at 70% of participants to be in a job six months after train-
ing. Before then, the incentives for cream-skimming may in general have not been very 
strong, since despite the fact that all programmes were followed up in terms of work place-
ment rates, goals in terms of these rates were left rather vague (e.g. the placement rate 
“should increase”). 
42 I thank Bernd Fitzenberger for having pointed this out to me.  32
make it less likely for an unemployed job-seeker to have to turn down a pro-
gramme offer perceived as second-best in order to wait for a free slot on his 
first-choice programme (this would also reduce the likelihood of an ‘Ashenfel-
ter dip’ problem in terms of reduced job search prior to participation). Even if 
he did wait, though, he would not enter his first-best programme with probabil-
ity one, but would still be exposed to the possibility of finding a job or deciding 
(or be forced) to join another programme in the meantime.  
An interesting piece of information in the Swedish dataset is an unemploy-
ment spell characterised by having been offered a labour market programme. 
Having gone through the selection process and having been offered a place is 
positively but far from perfectly correlated with subsequent participation.  
In addition, the possibility of a supply constraint is directly controlled for by 
including variables that reflect local conditions and capture the possibility of a 
limited supply of programmes for which registered job-seekers may be compet-
ing. Thus besides the local variable denoting the county, we have constructed 
two such indicators at the level of the municipality (basically most "kommun" 
have one employment office, though the biggest cities might have several). The 
‘programme-rate’ is given by the number of participants in all programmes as a 
proportion of all individuals registered as openly unemployed or as programme 
participants at the individual’s municipality the month he enters the programme. 
This information relates to the local programme capacity, e.g. in terms of slots 
available. By contrast the ‘offer-rate’, representing the proportion of unem-
ployed workers who have been offered a labour market programme out of all 
openly unemployed who are registered at that municipality in that month, gives 
an idea of the degree of utilisation of the programme capacity, e.g. in terms of a 
waiting list of unemployed individuals having already been offered to partici-
pate and against whom a potential candidate is competing. 
Simultaneously conditioning on individual programme offer, local programme 
rate and local offer rate prevailing at the time of the joining-waiting decision 
should go a long way towards controlling for anticipatory effects in terms of  33
subsequent programme participation. Finally, to account for seasonal patterns in 
programme entry
43, the month of first registration is also included.
44 
2. ‘Waiting’ outcome as subsequent employment  
Several pieces of information are used to capture and characterise the recent 
unemployment history of the individuals under examination, the variable identi-
fied to be the most important one (even more than earnings dynamics) by 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). All our individuals register at the unem-
ployment office for their first time
45, so their only (recent) unemployment ex-
perience relates to the present unemployment spell. As outlined in Section 5.1, 
unemployment duration both captures observables and provides an upper bound 
to average unobserved ability. Part-time unemployment spells denote individu-
als who are still maintaining contact with the regular labour market and are 
probably both subject to less human capital depreciation and in a better position 
to look for a (full-time) job, by exploiting their bargaining position, additional 
contacts and references. Similarly, individuals entitled to unemployment bene-
fits are also characterised by a good degree of labour market attachment due to 
the work requirement they have to fulfil. A subjective indicator of experience 
for the profession sought (none, some, good) is another interesting piece of in-
formation provided in the present dataset. Looking at the incidence of the three 
levels by age reveals that it is in fact quite a reliable indicator. Difference in 
prior work experience is important since it results from both observed and un-
observed differences between characteristics of the treated and non treated (cf. 
Ham and LaLonde, 1996). This indicator can be viewed as a summary statistics 
of the amount – as well as effectiveness, transferability and obsolescence – of 
previous human capital accumulation, on-the-job training and learning-by-
doing.  
                                                 
43 Participation in the various types of programmes exhibits strong seasonal fluctuations, with 
significant drops in summer (August) and to a lesser extent in January. 
44 It should be kept in mind that we are always conditioning exactly on elapsed unemployment 
duration. 
45 At least since the beginning of the Händel dataset, in August 1991.  34
An issue that needs to be considered is the possibility for unemployed indi-
viduals to be re-hired by their former employer. If they know that their em-
ployer is going to call them back (e.g. they are seasonal workers, or have a 
credible agreement with their employer allowing the temporarily dismissed em-
ployee to collect unemployment benefits), they are likely to have no (or less) 
incentives to participate in programmes at any given month in unemployment; 
in addition, they do find employment. In such a scenario, the CIA would be vio-
lated: programme participation would be (negatively) correlated with a subse-
quent outcome (job accession), which would bias our estimates of programme 
effects (downwardly). Other observables included to control for potential an-
ticipatory effects of this kind include the occupation/skill type of the job-
seeker, as well as the month of registration, which should help capture seasonal 
unemployment. There is in fact explicit information in our data recording if an 
unemployed individual de-registers because he has obtained further employment 
by his former employer. Although qualitative analyses based on this informa-
tion would indicate that recalls are not likely to be too serious a problem, the 
quality of this code has been found to be low: interviews with unemployed indi-
viduals who had found a job show that recalls are much more common than re-
corded in the data (Jansson, 1999). 
More generally, the CIA would be violated in the presence of hidden job of-
fers, that is if an individual waiting longer has decided to do so because he 
knows that he will be hired shortly. It has to be said, though, that our by-month 
version of CIA is less likely to be violated due to this kind of anticipatory ef-
fects than the traditional ‘overall’ CIA defining non-treated as those individuals 
whose unemployment spell is not interrupted by any programme, but directly 
ends in de-registration. An individual who in month m is offered to start a job in 
month k (k>m) represents a violation of the ‘traditional’ CIA, but of only (m-k) 
of our CIA’s. How serious this issue is going to be in our case thus largely de-
pends on the typical time span between job offer and job commencement (and  35
whether or not an individual who is going to start a job typically remains/is al-
lowed to remain registered at the unemployment office in the meantime). 
 
Results from the estimation of the propensity score for each pair of sub-
groups 
A series of 18 probits has been estimated, each one modelling the probability of 
joining a programme after m∈ {1, 2, …18} months spent in unemployment.   
The two subgroups used to estimate the probability of participating in a pro-
gramme, conditional on having reached an unemployment duration of m months, 
are the subgroup of treated entering a programme in their m
th month and the 
subgroup of non treated still unemployed after m months. 
All variables are measured at first entry into unemployment, except those re-
lating to the present unemployment spell, which are calculated at ‘entry’ into 
the programme (where for the non-treated, ‘entry’ refers to the month of unem-
ployment by which they have been stratified). A rather flexible specification 
has been allowed for by including all relevant interaction terms and a quadratic 
for age. 
It is interesting to look at the factors which significantly affect the treatment 
probability by unemployment duration. In fact, the direction of their impact as 
well as their statistical significance often change depending on how long the in-
dividuals have already been unemployed. 
•   Demographic factors 
Gender – or its interactions –, as well as citizenship never seem to play a role 
in the participation participation. Age has by contrast a more complex influ-
ence: for individuals remaining unemployed up to 10
 months, age has a strong 
negative effect, which increases, in absolute size, with age, while for individu-
als joining programmes later, age plays no statistically significant role up to the 
14
th month, after which age has a positive effect, increasing with age.  36
•   Human capital  
The only educational category which has a consistently significant and posi-
tive effect on programme participation is vocational secondary education. Indi-
viduals with secondary (non-vocational) education are more likely to participate 
than the lowest educational group (compulsory education) only if in the first 
half of their first year of unemployment, while degree holders are slightly more 
likely to join than the base group in the second half of their first year of unem-
ployment. 
Indicators of the level of experience unemployed individuals regard them-
selves as having for the job they have applied for, as well as an indicator denot-
ing the individual’s judgement concerning the suitability of his education for 
the profession sought have no impact on the probability of receiving treatment. 
On the other hand, missing the above information is a consistently extremely 
significant deterrent to programme participation. Information is generally miss-
ing when it is difficult to establish what occupation is suitable for the job-
seeker, generally someone without experience and/or occupation-specific train-
ing or someone who for some reason cannot return to his previous occupation. 
Recently self-registration is becoming more common, so that an alternative ex-
planation is that individuals who do not take the trouble of filling in the rele-
vant form may send a signal to placement officers of not being particularly keen 
or ’co-operative’;  
•   Entitlement status 
The changing impact of entitlement status over the unemployment duration 
prior to joining the programme is undoubtedly the most interesting finding 
among the determinants of programme participation. Figure 5.1 shows the evo-
lution of the marginal effect of UI status over unemployment duration prior to 
joining the programme. The plotted marginal effects represent the percentage 
points difference in the probability of entering a programme in that month of 
individuals entitled to UI vis-à-vis non-entitled individuals, who however have 
the same observed characteristics of UI-individuals.   37
 
Figure 5.1  Marginal effect of UI-status on the probability of joining a pro-
gramme (percentage points difference in the treatment probability with respect 
to non-entitled with the same characteristics of UI individuals), by time unem-














For almost the entire first year in unemployment, roughly up to the 10
th 
month, receiving benefits discourages programme participation. The effect then 
becomes insignificant, while just at benefit exhaustion, i.e. after 14 months, the 
effect becomes significant and its sign reversed: being entitled to UI increases 
the likelihood of now joining a programme, with the impact reaching its peak 
just after benefit exhaustion – in the 15
th month of unemployment. Being enti-
tled to UI confers to individuals reaching this unemployment duration an 11 
percentage points higher likelihood of being accepted into a programme than 
observably identical non-entitled individuals. Carling, Edin, Harkman and 
Holmlund (1996) as well had found that UI-entitled individuals close to benefit 
exhaustion are significantly more likely to join a programme than those without 
unemployment compensation. Note that unemployed individuals seem to have 
quite a tight control on their entry into programmes
46, which lends further sup-
port to our assumption of no anticipatory effects. 
                                                 
46 During most of the 1990s, unemployed individuals approaching benefit exhaustion were 
guaranteed the right to participate in programme in case they were unable to find a job. 
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•   Profession sought 
While the occupational sector does not seem to ever influence the probability 
of being treated, looking for a part-time job has a negative impact on the pro-
gramme participation decision throughout. Specifically looking for a part-time 
job penalises individuals wishing to participate vis-à-vis those looking for a 
full-time occupation or being willing to accept either. By contrast, being willing 
to accept a job somewhere else has a positive, albeit small effect on the likeli-
hood of entering a programme in a given month. 
•   Present unemployment spell 
Having experienced at least one part-time unemployment sub-spell has a con-
sistently negative impact on the probability of joining a programme. Individuals 
who have been employed part-time but, deeming this unsatisfactory, remained 
registered are significantly less likely to be offered a programme, irrespective 
of their unemployment duration. Within this group, entitled individuals (and es-
pecially UI – part-time unemployed can – and do! – claim benefits) are further 
penalised.  
Looking now at the overall assessment by placement officers of the unem-
ployed individual’s situation, having already gone through the selection process 
and having been offered a labour market programme is the single most impor-
tant determinant of the joining ‘now’ decision, with a consistently highly sig-
nificant and positive impact of around 15 percent (for the average individual in 
our sample). Similarly, unemployed individuals having experienced sub-spells 
where it was felt they needed guidance are consistently more likely to partici-
pate than those unemployed who have never been considered in such a need. 
Maybe less intuitive is the positive effect of having experienced at least one un-
employment sub-spell with the placement services (could take a job immedi-
ately), which has a positive impact throughout. By contrast, unemployed indi-
viduals having been considered difficult to place, or belonging to the special 
category (workers temporarily dismissed for less than 10 days, holiday workers 
not receiving unemployment benefits or job-seekers looking for a job with a du- 39
ration of less than 10 days) are slightly less likely to join a programme at any 
month than those who have never belonged to any of these categories. 
Finally, the significance and sign of month of entry into unemployment vary 
by unemployment duration. 
•   Local conditions 
While the significance and sign of the county of residence vary by minimum 
duration of unemployment, the local participation rate displays a significantly 
positive impact on the participation probability throughout: individuals in a 
municipality with a programme capacity one percentage point higher than in 
another municipality are 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points more likely to participate 
in that month. By contrast, the local offer rate has a significantly negative im-
pact; unemployed individuals in a municipality where the proportion of job-
seekers on the programme waiting list is one percentage point higher than in 
another municipality are 0.2 to 0.9 percentage points less likely to join a pro-
gramme.  
 
Quality of matching 
This paragraph presents some basic information concerning the ability of the 
propensity score of summarising all the pre-treatment variables, and in particu-
lar the extent to which matching on these estimated probabilities balances the 
relevant variables between the treated and the selected matched non-treated to 
be used as comparisons.
47 
Table 5.1 presents comparisons of the means in key characteristics, including 
the propensity score, between the two groups, as well as an indicator suitable to 
assess the ‘distance’ of the marginal distributions of the relevant characteristics 
in both groups (cf. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). For a given covariate X, the 
standardised difference after matching is defined as the difference of the sample 
means in the treated and matched non-treated subsamples as a percentage of the  
                                                 
47 For further details see the Appendix.  40
Table 5.1 Imbalance of the most important covariates:  
Means in the two groups and standardised differences (%) 
 
 Treated Matched 
Controls 
% bias
Age at entry   29.3 29.6  -2.86
Gender female)   49.3 48.5  1.48
Foreign   24.8 24.7  0.38
Education    
   compulsory  17.8 17.5  0.78
   upper secondary  17.3 17.4  -0.30
   vocational upper secondary  49.7 49.6  0.06
   university  15.2 15.5  -0.60
Education for job sought (yes)  58.2 58.6  -0.79
Experience for job sought    
   some  24.0 24.3  -0.65
   good  38.5 38.9  -0.91
Missing information   5.1 5.0  0.63
Entitlement status    
   UI  30.3 31.3  -2.09
   KAS  5.0 5.5  -2.30
County    
   Stockholm  17.5 17.4  0.16
   Göteborg and Bohus   14.8 14.8  0.06
   Malmöhus  12.7 12.9  -0.55
Sector    
   professional and technical work   13.9 13.9  0.24
   health, nursing and social work  11.3 11.4  -0.03
   administrative, managerial and clerical work  13.2 13.5  -0.92
   sales  11.9 12.0  -0.13
   production  20.9 21.5  -1.55
   services  9.7 9.7  -0.08
Part-time   3.0 3.1  -0.71
Interlocal 17.4 17.5  -0.17
Month of registration   6.3 6.4  -2.82
   January   8.8 8.6  0.54
   June   18.2 17.9  0.74
   August   12.2 12.4  -0.36
First register as part-time unemployed   3.2 3.0  1.16
Part-time unemployment   6.8 6.6  1.00
Type of unemployed    
   able to take a job immediately  77.4 77.9  -1.16
   offered a labour market programme   5.4 4.9  2.23
   need guidance   21.2 21.3  -0.21
Propensity score  -1.262 -1.267  0.95
Average absolute standardised difference    0.86
Median absolute standardised difference    0.71
Number of observations  31,975 31,975  41
square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated 
groups.
48 
Overall, the quality of the selected comparison group seems high; the remain-
ing bias in the score index is barely less than 1%, but what really matters is to 
look at the biases for the various covariates one is trying to balance. Important 
characteristics capturing human capital (such as experience,  education and the 
‘motivation’ indicator) present a remaining bias of less than 1%, while entitle-
ment status is balanced with a 2% remaining bias. In fact, the bias for any co-
variate is well below 3%. A summary statistics for the overall balance of the re-
gressors between the two groups is offered by the median and mean absolute 
standardised bias (median and mean taken with respect to all the variables), 
which are 0.7 and 0.9% respectively. 
 
5.2.3  Outcomes over time 
This section looks at various measures of outcomes over a five-year period to 
investigate how unemployed individuals who join a programme perform, on av-
erage, compared to a situation where they would have waited further. We corre-
spondingly start by assessing the dynamic effect of joining a programme on the 
programme participation probability, summarising both the (endogenous) dura-
tion of the programme joined as well as possible repeated participation in sub-
sequent programmes. Had they postponed their waiting decision, participants 
would have remained openly unemployed; an interesting outcome to assess is 
thus the unemployment probability, and in particular in terms of compensated-
unemployment probability. We also look at the intermediate outcome given by 
the probability of being part-time unemployed (employed), before focussing on 
the employment probability, which after the initial lock-in effects comprises the  
both the treatment impact on the job finding probability and on job attachment 
once employed. We finally consider the treatment effect on other routes out of 
                                                 












M () () /
  42
the unemployment system, in particular on the probability of regular education 
and of non-participation. 
To fix ideas, it may be useful to start with the interpretation of the graphs in 
Figure 5.2, depicting the probability of programme participation for treated and 
matched controls over time, as well as the corresponding treatment effect. By 
definition, at time 0 the probability of the treated to be on a programme is one, 
while for the controls it is zero. One month later, at t=1, a participant has, on 
average, an 89% chance of still being on the programme. Had he instead not 
gone on a programme when he did but had he waited longer, he would be ex-
pected, on average, to be on a programme one month later with probability 0.12.  
The treatment effect starts at entry into the programme, so that the treated-
controls differential probability of subsequently being on a programme is 
viewed as the causal effect of joining ‘now’ versus waiting ‘longer’, averaged 
over the participants’ distribution of months of placement. The graph shows a 
relatively large and persistent treatment effect: for up to two and a half years 
from joining, participants are significantly more likely to be on a programme 
than if they had further postponed their initial participation decision.  
 
Figure 5.2 Programme participation probability for treated and controls over 
time and corresponding treatment effect 
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A serious indication about the influence of programmes on subsequent labour 
market status is given by the unemployment probability, and in particular by  43
probability of being on unemployment benefits over time. While Figure 5.3A 
shows absolutely no treatment effect on the probability of being unemployed 
after the typical programme duration, Figure 5.4 indicates that as soon as the 
programme typically ends (i.e. after about 4 months), the negative effect (by 
construction, compensation while on programmes is not counted as unemploy-
ment benefits) abruptly turns into a large positive one. Over our horizon, par-
ticipants remain significantly more likely to be drawing benefits up to four 
years after having joined the programme. 
 
Figure 5.3 Treatment effect on the probability of 
(A) unemployment 
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(B) being de-registered/employed 
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An intermediate outcome between employment and unemployment is part-
time unemployment. On the one hand, if one looks at it as part-time employ-
ment, one may claim that such individuals are in fact in the regular labour mar-
ket, are earning a wage, and are possibly accumulating job-specific human capi-
tal. On the other hand, these individuals view themselves as unemployed (albeit 
part-time), are considered by the offices as job-seekers (looking for a full-time 
job), and, most importantly, can claim benefits
49. In fact over two thirds of all 
part-time unemployment spells in our data have positive compensation. Thus it 
is with mixed feelings that one may regard the outcome in terms of the prob-
                                                 
49 Individuals who look for full-time work but are only able to get a part-time job can receive 
UI to compensate for their loss of income; since 1993 there is no limit on the duration of such 
complementary payments.  44
ability of being part-time (un)employed. It turns out that programmes have an 
initial negative (lock-in) effect, which then becomes insignificant over the re-
maining horizon. 
 
Figure 5.4 Benefit collection probability for treated and controls over time and 
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A particularly important outcome is the probability of being employed over 
time. Do individuals who have joined a programme in a given month spend 
more time in regular employment, overall, than if they had further postponed 
their participation decision? How does programme participation affect partici-
pants’ short and long-term employment probabilities? 
The graphs in Figure 5.5 show that while on average joining programmes ini-
tially reduces the chance of finding employment (lock-in effect), when they 
typically end it appears that participants perform significantly better than their 
(at-least-up-to-now)-non-treated counterparts, displaying statistically signifi-
cantly higher and increasing employment shares over time. Over the first 5 
years since the start of the programme, the treated seem to enjoy an average of 
5% higher employment probability. Joining a programme ‘now’ seems to actu-
ally reduce the expected overall time out of regular employment, on average. 
  45
Figure 5.5 Employment probability for treated and controls over time and cor-
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This conclusion is not however supported when assessing a different type of 
outcome: the probability of being out of the unemployment system. This out-
come encompasses the previous one – the probability of being employed – but it 
also considers as a ‘success’ other reasons for being de-registered, given by 
having gone on regular education, having left the labour force or having been 
de-registered because of ‘contact ended’. What we know about people being de-
registered is that they are somewhere ‘out there’, in the labour market, out of 
the labour force, on other education – in any case out of the official unemploy-
ment system and certainly not claiming benefits.  
When considering this type of outcome, programmes do not seem to be bene-
ficial. Much to the contrary, the initial sizeable negative lock-in effect is gradu-
ally reduced in size, still the negative programme effect persists up to the end 
of the 3
rd year since joining the programme (see Figure 5.3B).  
In order to shed more light on these two contradictory results, we next look 
at the programme effect on the various labour market states that make up the 
‘out of the unemployment system’ one.  46
Let us begin by looking at the probability of studies in the regular education 
system. If programmes enhance participants’ human capital, they may find it 
easier to accumulate further human capital and may decide to deepen or special-
ise the acquired knowledge. So do programmes lead to further educational in-
vestments? The answer from the Figure 5.6 is that joining programmes does not 
seem to have any statistically significant effect on education rates beyond the 
initial negative lock-in impact. Participants are no more likely to invest in fur-
ther education than comparable individuals who have postponed their participa-
tion decision. By contrast, joining seems to have a significantly negative effect 
on non-participation rates
50, which persists up to 5 years after the joining deci-
sion.  
 
Figure 5.6 Treatment effect on the probability of being on  
(A) regular education 
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This is however a small treatment effect, so that the suspicion arises that the 
divergent impact on employment rates and on de-registration/employment  rates 
may in fact be due to a negative programme impact on the last type of registra-
tion, the ‘lost’ status. In the following, ‘lost’ refers to an individual spell fol-
lowing de-registration, the reason of which has been recorded as ‘contact 
ended’. This happens when a registered unemployed individual, having first 
missed an appointment at the official employment office, subsequently fails to 
                                                 
50 Note that non-participation includes education in the regular system.  47
contact the agency within a week. In fact, the negative programme effect on 
‘lost’ rates is decidedly large (Figure 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.7 Lost probability for treated and controls over time and correspond-
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The problem of the ‘lost’ individuals is a serious ones; in fact, it prevents us 
from fully observing the outcome of interest, that is the true labour market 
status these individuals find themselves in. We do not know which of these 
spells is in reality an employment spell the former unemployed did not bother to 
report to the agency, and which is by contrast still part of the preceding unem-
ployment spell. It has to be said that many of these lost spells are followed by 
unemployment spells, but even when over half of the lost spells observed in our 
data are preceded as well as followed by unemployment spells, one should not 
be entitled to infer that the individual had in reality remain unemployed all the 
time, since he might have found a job without reporting it and then lost it again.  
Bring and Carling (2000), who have tried to trace back a sample of ‘lost’ in-
dividuals, have found that around half of them had in fact found a job, which 
highlights how severely under-reported employment status is in the available 
data. The large negative programme effect on ‘lost’ rates would thus turn out to 
be in part a large negative effect on employment rates.  48
In conclusion, the above evidence for a positive programme impact on em-
ployment probability needs to be carefully checked against these lost spells. We 
have started some further investigation using various sensitivity analysis, 
bounds and imputation techniques, the results of which are sketched in the next 
section. 
 
5.2.4  Trying to account for a partially unobserved outcome variable 
The analyses of the preceding section have clearly shown that the uncovered 
evidence for a positive programme impact on employment probability may not 
necessarily be robust to the presence of the lost spells. This section presents 
some selected results of the investigations performed in this direction, leaving 
it to future work to thoroughly address the issue of the ‘lost’ individuals for all 
the types of analysis performed in the whole of Section 5.  
In the following, define Yi to be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual 
is in employment (at a given time) and 0 otherwise. For simplicity of exposi-
tion, let us abstract from time and from the two groups (the calculations have 
obviously been performed separately for each group and for each point in time). 
Let L be a dummy variable indicating the ‘lost’ state, and D the usual treatment 
indicator. 
A very simple sensitivity analysis without any additional external informa-
tion looks at the estimated effects on employment rates under various assump-
tions about the percentage of ‘lost’ individuals who have in reality found a job. 
A ‘misclassification’ rate of 0% would thus mean that the observed employment 
rates (thus the effect on employment probability in Figure 5.5) are the true 
ones, while at the other extreme a 100% misclassification rate would imply that 
it is the sum of the observed employment rates and lost rates that represents the 
true employment rate. Note that this analysis assumes that the probability of be-
ing misclassified is the same for lost treated and lost controls, that is that out-
come data Y are missing completely at random:  
P(Y=1 | L=1, D=1) = P(Y=1 | L=1, D=0).  49
Figure 5.8 confirms that the observed average employment effect (4.8%) 
would in fact decline with more lost individuals having in reality found a job. 
With the almost 50% misclassification rate found in the survey by Bring and 
Carling (2000), it would be more than halved. Still, to have the effect disappear 
or change sign, one would need to assume that 80% or more of the lost indi-
viduals had in reality found a job.  
 
Figure 5.8 Average treatment effects on employment probability (averaged over 






















A second step makes use of external information provided by the follow-up 
survey by Bring and Carling (2000) to impute to each ‘lost’ individual spell the 
probability of it in reality being an employment spell. Unfortunately, the X’s 
used by these authors do not include previous programme participation.
51 We 
thus need to assume that the misclassification probability is independent of 
treatment status, this time however given observables X, in other words, that the 
outcome data Y is missing at random: 
P(Y=1 | X=x, L=1, D=1) = P(Y=1 | X=x, L=1, D=0) 
Using Bring and Carling (2000, Table 4)  > β  coefficient estimates, the condi-
tional probability of misclassification of a given lost individual with observed 
characteristics X is estimated by: 
                                                 
51 Regressors include age group, gender, foreign status, human capital indicators (work ex-
perience, education), city region, and a few age-human capital interaction terms. Implicitly, 
we are also conditioning on non-entitlement: being registered is a prerequisite for drawing 
benefits, and in fact none of the lost spells in our data is characterised by unexpired eligibil-
ity.   50
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Two alternative strategies are then pursued. 
We decide that a given lost individual has in reality found a job if his mis-
classification probability is larger than a given cutoff τ , that is if  > pi
Y>τ  we con-
sider that lost spell as an employment spell. The analysis of the treatment effect 
on employment probability is then performed as in Section 5.2.3 for various 
cutoffs τ .
52 Figure 5.9 – strikingly similar to Figure 5.8 – summarises the corre-
sponding average employment effects; in fact if can be seen that a positive ef-
fect persists up to a cutoff as low as 30%. 
 
Figure 5.9 Average Employment Effect by Cut-Off Probability  
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An alternative possibility is to count a lost individual with an (estimated) 
misclassification probability  > pi
Y as a ( > pi
Y)
th  of an employed individual. In fact, 
simple calculations show that we can estimate the employment rate (separately 
for the treated group and the control group and at a given time period) as
53:  
                                                 
52 Note that a cutoff of 0 corresponds to a 100% misclassification rate, while a cutoff of 1 to a 
0% misclassification rate. 
53 The object of interest is the employment probability (or employment rate) for a given group 
at a given time, P(Y=1), which can be written as:  PY PY X xPX x
x () (| ) ( ) == = = = ∑ 11 .  
P(X =x) can be estimated by #{X=x}/N , where #{A} denotes the number of elements in set A 
and N is the total number of individuals in the group being considered. We thus focus on 
P(Y=1|X=x), which can be decomposed as:  
P(Y=1|X=x)=P(Y=1|X=x,L=0)P(L=0|X=x)+ P(Y=1|X=x,L=1)P(L=1|X=x). 
In our data we observe all terms except P(Y=1|X=x,L=1), for which we use the estimated 
probability that a ‘lost’ individual with characteristics X has in reality found a job. That is: 
P(Y=1|X=x,L=1) is estimated by  > pi





















where N is the total number of individuals (in the group and time period un-
der consideration). The resulting dynamic treatment effect on employment is 
plotted in Figure 5.10 below. Even though visibly reduced from the observed 
one, joining a programme seems to still have a long-lasting positive impact on 
employment rates over time, compared to similar individuals who have decided 
to wait longer. 
In these last two types of analyses, we have used the imputed misclassifica-
tion probability to estimate the employment probability of a lost individual irre-
spective of his treatment status – a regressor not included in the estimation by 
Bring and Carling (2000).
54 This amounts to assuming that for a given set of the 
X’s, the distribution of the probability that a lost individual has in reality found 
a job is the same in the treated and non-treated groups. In our case, treated in-
dividuals are those observed to enter a programme, while all we know about 
non-treated individuals is that they not necessarily do so, making it not easy to 
argue if such an assumption is likely to be systematically violated, and if yes, in 
which direction. Still, since we are looking at outcome measures (probabilities 
or rates) which are bounded, we can apply the core idea of the literature on non-
parametric bounds in the presence of missing data (see e.g. Manski, 1990) and 
exploit the additional information from the survey to derive worst- and best-
case bounds for the treatment effect of employment rates. 
We start by writing the conditional misclassification probability of lost indi-
viduals with characteristics X as: 
P(Y=1 | X=x, L =1) = P(Y=1 | X=x, L=1, D=1) P(D=1 | X=x, L=1) + 
 +  P(Y=1 | X=x, L=1, D=0) [1–P(D=1 | X=x, L=1)] 
                                                                                                                                                     
P(Y=1|X=x,L=0) by Y i
iX x L ∈= = ∑
{, } 0
/ #{X=x,L=0}. Simplifying and integrating out the X’s finally 
yields the formula in the main text.  52
For each lost individual, we know: 
•   his treatment status D∈ {0,1} 
•   his treatment probability given the lost status, P(D =1 | Xi, L=1)≡ ei 
55 
•   his misclassification probability P(Yi=1 | Xi, Li=1) ≡   > pi
Y 
The procedure to derive worst- and best-case bounds (where worst or best are 
from the point of view of programme effectiveness) consists in assigning 
π i≡ P(Yi=1 | Xi,Li=1,D=di) by setting π i≡ P(Yi=1 | Xi,Li=1,D=1–di) to its maxi-
mum or minimum, compatible with the given  > pi
Y and ei, as well as with all 
probabilities  P(• )∈ [0,1]. Table 5.2 displays the setting of π i and the corre-
sponding computation of π i for the various cases, while the resulting bounds on 
the treatment effect on employment rates over time are shown in Figure 5.10. 
As expected, the treatment effect under the best-case scenario far surmounts 
the observed one, with the joining decision paying off in terms of a sizeable and 
increasing extra chance of being in employment over time. In fact, while the 
observed treatment effect soon stabilises at around 6%, the favourable bound 
keeps rising, reaching double a level (12%) five years after programme start. 
Quite interestingly, the upper bound on the employment effect is in fact always 
larger than the observed one in absolute size, entailing a larger lock-in effect 
                                                                                                                                                     
54 Other important information regarding the unemployment spell prior to attrition is similarly 
missing, in particular the duration of the unemployment spell prior to attrition or the number 
of times the individual has registered as unemployed before attrition. 
55 Due to the absence of a ‘standard’ D=0 control group, the probability that a lost spell with 
characteristics X belongs to a treated as opposed to a ‘non-treated’ individual has been esti-
mated separately by month of entry. In particular, for a given treated i, ei is the estimated 
probability that a lost spell with characteristics Xi belongs to a treated individual as opposed 
to an individual who was still unemployed when treated i joined the programme. An individ-
ual j who is used (possibly repeatedly) as control for a treated entering in month m1 starts be-
ing evaluated from m1  and if he has lost spells, the corresponding employment probability 
bounds are calculated using the probability that a lost spell with his characteristics Xj belongs 
to an individual treated in month m1 as opposed to an individual who was still unemployed 
after m1 months. If this same individuals j also acts as control for another treated entering in 
month m2, he counts as another person whose outcome starts being evaluated from m2 and 
whose lost spells are evaluated using bounds on the probability that a lost spell with his char-
acteristics Xj belongs to an individual treated in month m2 as opposed to an individual who 
was still unemployed after m2 months.  53
during the first five months. Similarly, the figure confirms the expectation of a 
dynamic worst-case-bound treatment effect considerably lower than the ob-
served one, with the former ranging between between -3 and 0 percentage 
points after the lock-in phase. Overall, the impression from the graph is that one 
may need to invoke assumptions particularly unfavourable to the treatment in 
order to have the treatment effect disappear or reverse sign. 
 
Table 5.2 Computation of π i to derive worst- and best-case bounds 
Worst-Case Scenario  Best-Case Scenario 
Treated Treated 
assign the highest possible π i  
compatible with  > pi
Y, ei and π i ≥  0 
assign the lowest possible π i  
compatible with  > pi
Y, ei and π i ≤ 1 
If  Set π i =  Thus π i =  If  Set π i =  Thus π i = 
> pi
Y≤ 1–ei  > pi
Y/(1–ei)  0  > pi
Y≥ ei ( > pi
Y–ei)/(1–ei)  1 
> pi
Y>1–ei  1  ( > pi
Y+ei–1)/ei  > pi
Y<ei  0  > pi
Y/ei 
Controls Controls 
assign the lowest possible π i 
compatible with  > pi
Y, ei and π i ≤  1 
assign the highest possible π i  
compatible with  > pi
Y, ei and π i ≥ 0 
If  Set π i =  Thus π i =  If  Set π i =  Thus π i = 
> pi
Y≥ 1–ei ( > pi
Y+ei–1)/ei  1  > pi
Y≤ ei  > pi
Y/ei  0 
> pi
Y<1–ei  0  > pi
Y/(1–ei)  > pi
Y>ei  1  ( > pi
Y–ei)/(1–ei) 
 
All the analyses in this section were meant to offer some qualitative
56 evi-
dence as to the robustness of the uncovered positive employment effect with re-
spect to the problem of the lost individuals. Overall, these findings would seem 
to indicate that the effect of participating in a programme compared to postpon-
ing such a decision may remain positive under a variety of assumptions. 
 
                                                 
56 No standard errors have yet been derived to inform about the significance of the effects.  54
Figure 5.10 Treatment effect on employment probability, using observed em-
















5.2.5  A summary so far 
Figure 5.11 organises and summarises the findings obtained so far concerning 
the treatment effects on the various labour market states considered. It reports 
both the monthly treatment effects averaged over the 5-year period from entry 
into the programme and an indication of the more permanent, long-term effects 
informally gauged from the graphs after 4-5 months from programme entry. The 
figure clearly highlights the importance of the true nature of the ‘lost’ state to 
truthfully reflect the treatment impact on actual (as opposed to as observed by 
the employment offices) employment. Some conclusions can however be drawn 
as to the treatment effect on unemployment. A large positive effect on compen-
sated unemployment, together with the absence of an effect on (registered) un-
employment, would entail a negative effect on uncompensated unemployment, 
which is likely to be further reinforced by the observed negative effect on ‘lost’ 
rates (note that ‘lost’ individuals who are in reality unemployed cannot be 
drawing compensation).   55
Figure 5.11 A summary so far: Average treatment effects on various labour market states (%)  
 







































































Note:   
•   Bracketed figures are the treatment effect averaged over the 5-year horizon since the start of the programme 
(cf. second column of Table 5.6);  
•   Non-bracketed figures refer to around 4-5 months after programme start and informally gauge more long-
term stable effects.  56
Thus, focussing on registered unemployment, what programmes seem to af-
fect is merely the type of the unemployment spell experienced, in particular the 
treatment ‘swaps’ uncompensated unemployment for compensated one.  
Broadening the scope to consider the effect on the ‘true’ unemployment rate 
(i.e. both official and un-registered, the latter as experienced by the ‘lost’ indi-
viduals), the treatment is likely to reduce it overall, achieving this by reducing 
the probability of uncompensated unemployment only (in fact, by more that it 
increases the probability of compensated unemployment).  
Finally, though, one should bear in mind that the treated also have a sizeably 
larger long-term probability of being on programmes than comparable individu-
als who have postponed their participation decision, so that the treated remain 
significantly more likely to be registered at an unemployment office over time. 
To roughly fix ideas, let us assume that, conditional on the X’s, the employ-
ment status of the lost individuals is missing at random for those who join and 
those who wait longer, so that we can imputed their employment probability. 
Let us further abstract from the non-participation state (a rather strong assump-
tion for the lost individuals). These two assumptions allow us to completely ‘at-
tribute’ the observed treatment effect on lost rates partly to the observed effect 
on employment and partly on unemployment rates. We further focus on that 
treatment effect which after 4-5 months (thus ignoring the initial lock-in effect 
and the endogenous duration of the treatment) seems more stable and permanent 
in nature.  
The figures resulting from this series of simplifying assumptions are pre-
sented in Table 5.3, where ‘de facto’ (as opposed to ‘observed’) highlights that 
we are trying to account for the lost spells. Joining a programme would thus 
make participants on average 3 percentage points more likely to be in employ-
ment over time, compared to similar individuals who have postponed their par-
ticipation decision. However, participants would also be 3 percentage points 
more likely to be in compensated unemployment and another 3 percentage 
points more likely to be on programmes over time. Overall, participants would  57
thus have on average a 9% lower probability of being in an unemployment spell 
not supported by benefits and not registered either. Under the various assump-
tions which allow such calculations, joining a programme compared to waiting 
‘longer’ would seem to ‘swap’ uncompensated, unregistered unemployment not 
only for compensated unemployment as well as for further programme partici-
pation, but also for employment in the regular labour market. 
 
Table 5.3   A crude summary of the effect of participation versus waiting: 
The more permanent treatment effect on the probability of being in the various 
states, 6 months after joining a programme 
 
de facto unemployed 
compensated 
a  non-compensated 
c 
on programmes 
a  de facto employed 
b 
+ 3%  – 9%  + 3%  + 3% 
 
Notes:  Non-participation state is ignored
  
a The more long-term effect is informally gauged from Figures 5.2 and 5.4. 
b Employment probability is imputed for the lost individuals (i.e. assuming  
  missing at random); the more long-term effect is then informally gauged from  
  Figure 5.10. 
c As implied by the other calculations. 
 
 
Treatment effects by month of placement 
Further interesting insights are gleaned when looking at the various outcomes 
for different sub-groups of the treated based on the time they have spent in un-
employment before being placed on a programme.  
Looking at the set of graphs by placement month (not shown) reveals that the 
treatment effects for individuals joining a programme earlier on – around the 
third month in unemployment – are considerably better, both of those for 1
st-
month joiners and especially of those for individuals placed on a programme in 
their 14
th month in unemployment – i.e. just around the time benefits expire. 
This can easily be appreciated from Table 5.4, which summarises the treatment 
effect over time in a single indicator, by taking the average over the 5-year ho-
rizon.  58
Table 5.4 Average treatment effects (over the 5-year horizon since the start of 
the programme) by month of placement into the programme (%) 
Rates/Probabilities Placement  in  x
th month: 
(% points)  1 to 18 1 3 6 14  18
Employment (observed)  4.8 1.3 4.8 4.7 2.3  3.1
Deregistered | employment  -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -3.5 -6.4  -7.3
Lost   -5.8 -4.7 -7.0 -4.8 -4.4  -6.1
Non-Participation -1.7 0.8 -0.5 -3.3 -4.4  -4.3
Education 0.0 0.9 0.7 -0.8 -0.3  0.5
On Programmes  7.4 7.2 6.9 8.3 8.2  12.2
Unemployment   -4.7 -4.5 -4.2 -4.8 -1.8  -4.9
Part-Time Unemployment   -0.4 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -1.5  -4.8
Benefit receipt  1.9 1.5 1.3 1.9 5.2  3.3
 
 
5.2.6 Job  accession 
When focusing on employment, we have thus far been considering employment 
rates over time. The probability of being employed at a given point in time 
summarises both potential effects on job finding rates (including the lock-in ef-
fect) and on job attachment once an occupation has been found.  
The next two types of analysis try to assess how these rates originate by 
looking at the two components of the employment effect in more detail.  
As it should be clear from the methodological discussion in Section 5.1, the 
three types of analysis are not directly comparable. The analysis expounded in 
Section 5.2.3 as well as the one presented in this section address more of a tim-
ing question concerning the impact of joining a programme versus waiting 
longer in open unemployment for individuals registering for their first time as 
unemployed, while the analysis of job attachment in Section 5.3.1 not only fo-
cuses on a different question, i.e. the effectiveness of programme participation 
compared to actual non-participation, but does so for a special sub-sample of 
the initially unemployed individuals. Finally, the following two analyses con-
sider a continuous spell (of unemployment and of employment, respectively)   59
only, while employment rates pertain to the status of individuals over the en-
tire observation period and irrespective of any interruption.  
 
Remaining unemployed for a long time can potentially be harmful in several 
ways; in addition to the sizeable social outlay for benefits needed to finance 
prolonged unemployment spells, the unemployed individuals’ human capital 
may quickly deteriorate, so that the jobs they may remain suited for will be-
come less and less skilled and qualified; they may gradually lose hope and mo-
tivation, reducing their search intensity and possibly suffering increasing psy-
chological costs. Finally, there may be a stigma effect associated to unemploy-
ment – as well as, possibly, to lengthy programme participation –, so that it may 
be important to find a job rather quickly. Such a stigma effect from both unem-
ployment and programme participation has in fact been documented by Agell 
and Lundborg (1999). Their 1998 survey of employers shows that 27% and 21% 
of the interviewed managers regard prolonged unemployment duration and pro-
gramme participation, respectively, as a strong signal of low productivity.
57 
Even participation in the most sought-after programme and the one most likely 
to raise human capital and thus productivity, labour market training, is viewed 
by 14% of employers as a strong indicator of low productivity. 
A very relevant question in such a context is thus whether individuals who 
have joined a programme find a job easier than if they had waited longer. 
In order to assess whether joining helps participants find a job sooner, we 
consider their survivor function in unemployment (possibly including post-
treatment subsequent programme participation) compared to what it would have 
been had they not entered the programme when they did. 
As in the previous analysis, unemployment duration for the treated is meas-
ured from their entry into the programme, for controls from the moment their 
respective matched participants joined the programme. 
                                                 
57 On a 1 to 9 scale, strong means a score of a least 7.  60
In the following, when considering unemployment duration we mean an unin-
terrupted spell, possibly made up of various sub-spells where the individuals 
are either registered as unemployed, as part-time unemployed or taking part in a 
programme. Such a wider ‘unemployment’ spell thus ends either in employ-
ment, or in de-registration for other reasons (in this paper, this includes ‘lost’, 
an issue that will be addressed in future work), or else is censored on the last 
observation day. Again note that this spell may include further programme par-
ticipation; subsequent programme participation – including the possibility of 
starting a cycle between unemployment and programmes – is regarded as an 
outcome of the treatment, defined as the first programme joining decision.  
The survival functions for the two groups plotted in Figure 5.12 are signifi-
cantly different, with participants expected to remain unemployed for 2 months 
or 15% longer than if they had postponed their participation decision. 
 
Figure 5.12 Survival function in unemployment (days) for treated and controls 
 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by treated
analysis time







Notes:  Test for equality of survivor functions: Pr>chi2=0.0000. 
Expected unemployment duration: treated – controls = 468 – 406 = 62 days. 
 
Looking at heterogeneous treatment effects on subsequent unemployment du-
ration by month of placement into the programme, reveals some interesting pat-
terns. First of all, the Figure 5.13A shows that the longer an individual has al-
ready been unemployed, the longer his remaining expected unemployment dura- 61
tion is going to be, and this irrespective of treatment status. Treated individuals, 
though, seem to remain unemployed for longer than comparable non-treated. 
What’s more, the magnitude of the impact varies greatly according to how long 
the participants have been unemployed before joining the programme (Figure 
5.13B). Roughly speaking, for individuals joining programmes earlier on the 
unfavourable treatment effect tends to be smaller in magnitude. For instance, 
those participants joining a programme in their first month subsequently remain 
unemployed for roughly one month longer than if they had waited longer, on 
average; for those joining the programme in their 14
th month in unemployment 
the extra unemployment duration is over 3 months. 
 
Figure 5.13  
(A) Average expected unemployment 
duration (days) for treated  
and controls, 










(B) Absolute (days) and relative (%) 
average treatment effect on unem-
ployment duration, 























5.3  The effect of participation versus actual non-participation 
5.3.1  Job  attachment 
We have thus seen that joining programmes does not seem to be more effective, 
on average, in getting participants into employment, compared to a situation 
where they would have waited further in open unemployment and availed them-
selves ‘full-time’ of the benchmark treatment represented by job placement.  62
Quite to the contrary, joining a programme appears to considerably prolong the 
overall time spent in unemployment (including further programmes) by the 
treated.  
This might however be due to a reduced job search while taking part in the 
programme (the lock-in effect that has always been part of the treatment effect), 
as well as to the possibility that programmes increase participants’ productivity 
and thus reservation wages. After completion of the programme participants 
may feel that they have enhanced their human capital and thus feel allowed to 
be more ‘choosy’ as to the level of jobs they would consider accepting. Pro-
grammes may in fact prevent individuals from taking the first low-skilled, dead-
end or temporary job they come across, which they might soon lose or quit 
anyway (and thus be possibly back crowding the employment offices).  
These considerations suggest the possibility that programmes may not neces-
sarily be very effective in getting participants into regular employment quickly, 
to the contrary they may indeed prolong the overall time spent as registered job-
seekers. In the light of the discussion in Section 2, there may be in fact the pre-
sumption that it is by contrast the benchmark treatment in terms of job search 
assistance and enhancement offered by the employment offices (and to which 
the controls have been exposed for longer) that may be more effective in getting 
unemployed individuals back into work faster. However, programmes may well 
endow unemployed workers with new working skills, enhanced productivity, 
additional work experience and improved working habits, which, once having 
the chance of being revealed on a job, may help former participants to remain 
employed longer. It could thus be that programmes may take more longer than 
full-time job placement but get participants into good (i.e. lasting) jobs rather 
than getting them quickly into short-lived ones.   
Since the stated objective of the Swedish active labour market policy is to 
reduce the registration periods at the unemployment offices, focussing on the 
impact of the programmes on the exit rate from unemployment ignoring what  63
happens once in employment would provide only a limited assessment of their 
effectiveness. 
This section tries to address the question of whether individuals who have ac-
tually participated in a programme and found a job stick to it longer than if they 
had not participated (and had found a job).  
 
Methodology 
In order to analyse the effect of the programmes on how stable and long-lasting 
the jobs found by participants turn out to be, we look at the survival function of 
the first employment spell for those who have found employment. 
The first step is thus to select the relevant sub-groups from the initial unem-
ployed population. The non-treated sub-pool is made up of individuals experi-
encing an unemployment spell followed by an employment spell: we keep as po-
tential controls all the UE-individuals (39,750 of them). The treated sub-group 
is composed of UP(U)E-individuals, that is of those treated who directly go 
from the programme to employment (UPE; 5,180 of them) and of those treated 
who resume their unemployment spell after the programme, after which they 
however find employment (UPUE; another 5,300 of them). 
We then estimate the propensity score on these two groups, giving the prob-
ability of belonging to the UP(U)E group. A crucially important regressor to in-
clude in estimation is the unemployment duration (of the complete first spell for 
non-treated UE-individuals and for the UPE-individuals and of the sum of the 
two U spells for the UPUE-individuals).
58  
Another set of crucial new variables to condition on is the type of employ-
ment found on exit from unemployment: employment by the former employer
59, 
                                                 
58 This variable has been included together with its main interaction terms and a quadratic.  
59 If some of our UE individuals have not gone on a programme because they knew they would 
be recalled and if recalled employment is a systematically different type of employment from 
non-recalled employment, say because it typically consists of seasonal employment, then UE 
recalled individuals’ employment spell may be bound from the start to be shorter. This would 
lead us to overestimate programme effects on survival in employment for those who have 
found a job. Conditioning on recalled employment, though not reliably recorded in the data 
(see the discussion in Section 5.2.2), should at least partly address this issue.  64
temporary employment (registered or not) and employment while still registered 
at the offices (i.e. temporary employment and employment while looking for a 
new job). 
Matching on the score can balance unobserved characteristics only to the ex-
tent that they are correlated with the observed ones used in estimation. Ob-
served unemployment duration (and to a lesser extent type of employment 
found) is therefore critical to this end, since matching on it should also elimi-
nate any observable and unobservable heterogeneity in exit from unemploy-
ment.  
The outlined procedure should also be robust to the possible existence of het-
erogeneous (according to observables) programme effects on job finding prob-
abilities. It is important to note that, as typical with the matching approach, we 
are not able to match away a programme effect on job accession rates that is 
heterogeneous with respect to still uncaptured unobserved variables. If such un-
accounted for variables also affect subsequent employment duration, the esti-
mated programme effects on job retention would be biased. To illustrate this 
point, the impact of the programme on employment duration would be down-
ward biased if the programme affected participants job finding rates, having a 
stronger impact, say, for low-ability individuals and if low-ability individuals 
remained on average employed for a shorter period. 
Note that we are matching also on post-treatment variables; this is because 
we aim at selecting two observably similar groups at the onset of the employ-
ment spell, in particular we want to match away possibly heterogeneous pro-
gramme effects on subsequent unemployment duration (i.e. job finding prob-
ability) as well as on the type of employment found, and we want these indi-
viduals to be as similar as possible with respect to all those variables which 
may influence employment duration, irrespective of whether such variables 
have themselves been affected by programme participation. 
Our resulting two groups should thus be made up of individuals who, at the 
start of their employment spell, are as similar as possible in terms of their ob- 65
served characteristics and, having experienced the same complete unemploy-
ment duration, possibly very similar in terms of unobservable characteristics 
which are thought to be relevant in terms of the outcome being evaluated – i.e. 
survival in employment. The sole remaining difference should ideally be that 
one group only has received the ‘pill’ of the programme (see Figure 5.13).
60 
 
Figure 5.14 Matching for job attachment 
Treated A  U      P    U             E  … 
Control  A’  U       E    … 
 
Treated A  U      P    E  …            
Control A’  U        E   …  
 
 
Survival in Employment 
We can now turn to the assessment of the programme effect on the outcome of 
interest here – the duration of employment for those who have found it. Figure 
5.15 reveals that the programme has had absolutely no effect whatsoever.
61  
 
Figure 5.15 Survival function in employment (days) for treated and matched 














                                                 
60 Matching quality information is presented in the Appendix, which shows that the critical 
variables total unemployment duration and type of employment have indeed been satisfacto-
rily matched. 
61 Test for equality of survivor functions: chi2(1) =  0.30, Pr>chi2 =  0.5816; 
Expected employment duration: treated – controls = 796 – 806 = -10 days.  66
In order to assess the importance of conditioning on unemployment duration, 
the same procedure has been carried out without including this variable. The 
results do change in fact quite dramatically, the two survivor functions being 
now statistically different (Pr>chi2=0.0001) and displaying a positive 
programme effect of 23 days (+3%). Assuming that the first specification is the 
‘correct’ one, this finding confirms the crucial role of recent unemployment 
history found by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).  
 
Heterogeneous Effects 
The whole analysis has been performed separately for various subgroups of the 
population of interest in order to investigate the possibility of heterogeneous 
programme effects on employment duration and to address the question of 
whether certain types of individuals stand a better chance than others to benefit 
from programme participation.  
In fact, no significant differential impact according to the time the individual 
has spent in unemployment before entering the programme, entitlement status, 
human capital (i.e. education and experience), sex, citizenship or age could be 
detected. The only, albeit mild evidence of heterogeneous programme effects is 
with respect to the propensity score (and for the very very young; for details, 
see the Appendix). In particular, programmes appear to benefit most those with 
a low probability of participating, while they seem to harm those with a higher 
participation probability (see Figure 5.16). 
 
Outcomes over Time 
The analysis is finally extended by moving beyond survival in an uninterrupted 
employment spell and following these individuals for up to 60 months from the 
start of their employment spell (t=0 thus marks the start of employment). Figure 
5.17A is representative of the treatment effects on the probability of being in 
various labour market states over time, showing a constant zero effect on em- 67
ployment probability
62, de-registration/employment probability, unemployment 
probability, programme participation probability, non-participation probability, 
education probability and part-time unemployment probability. Figure 5.17B 
shows that the only ‘advantage’ former participants have is in terms of a posi-
tive effect (of around 5%) for up to 10 months on benefit collection probability. 
 















Note: for significant effects, the figures in the boxes denote the significance level. 
 
Figure 5.17 Treatment effect over time on  
(t months after entry into employment) 
(A) various outcome probabilities ** 
t











(B) benefit collection probability 
t
treatm effect P(benefits)  upper 95% bound
 lower 95% bound












** Graphs virtually identical for probability of employment, of de-registration/employment, 
of unemployment, of programme participation, of non-participation, of regular education and 
of part-time unemployment. 
                                                 
62 In contrast to survival in continuous employment, this outcome indicator would capture 
transitions to other jobs which are interrupted by (however short) unemployment spells. 
.01
.06 .06 68
5.3.2  Falling  back  into  unemployment  
So far we have seen that programmes, far from helping participants to find jobs 
sooner, keep them longer unemployed. And once participants do find a job, they 
do not seem to be able to retain it any longer than if they had not participated. 
Still, should they lose it (again), it could be that programmes have equipped 
them with skills – maybe just in terms of knowledge and taking advantage of 
the functioning of the unemployment system – which allow them to deal with 
subsequent unemployment more effectively. 
This section tries to investigate whether those former participants who are 
observed to fall back into unemployment can deal with this condition more effi-
ciently than if they had not been treated in their first unemployment experience. 
In particular, we examine whether the programme has taught them how to exit 
from unemployment faster, including availing themselves of programmes (the 




Matching is performed in the same spirit as it has been done in the previous 
type of analysis. 
First, the two sub-groups of interest are selected: the non-treated are of the 
type UEU (22,900 of them), while the treated are the UP(U)EU individuals 
(over 6,000 of them). Secondly, the propensity score is estimated, this time in-
cluding among the regressors the total unemployment duration before finding a 
job and the type of employment found (and lost), as well as the time spent in 
employment; and finally, matching is performed.
63 
Ideally, the procedure should ensure that at the beginning of their second un-
employment occurrence, the group of treated and the group of matched controls 
have the same relevant observed as well as unobserved characteristics (the latter 
captured by conditioning on their labour market history, including the duration 
                                                 
63 For information on matching quality, see the Appendix.  69
of their unemployment and employment spells). The two groups should differ 
only in that the treated alone have experienced a programme in their previous 
open unemployment spell (Figure 5.18). 
 
Figure 5.18 Matching for repeated unemployment 
  U  P  U   E   U    …    treated  A   
 
       U    E     U  …        control A’ 
 
 
Survival in Unemployment 
We are now in a position to look at the programme impact on continuous unem-
ployment duration once fallen back into unemployment, where unemployment 
includes time possibly spent participating in programmes. As for job attach-
ment, the survivor functions are indistinguishable (see Figure 5.19).
64 
 
Figure 5.19 Survival function in continuous unemployment (days) for treated 
and matched controls who fall back into unemployment 
 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by treated
analysis time








                                                 
64 Test for equality of survivor functions: chi2(1) =  0.00, Pr>chi2 =  0.9486; 
Expected unemployment duration: treated – controls = 279 – 288 = -9 days. 
Again, if one were to ignore unemployment and employment duration, the results would be 
strikingly different (chi2(1) =  19.81, Pr>chi2 = 0.0000).  70
Heterogeneous Effects 
As for survival in employment, no significant differential programme impact 
has been found depending on the individuals’ characteristics, with some hetero-
geneous effect being again confined to the participation probability (this time, 
however, it is individuals with a very low propensity score who suffer a harmful 
programme effect, while the reverse is true for individuals with a very high par-
ticipation probability – see Figure 5.20, and, for more details, the Appendix). 
  















Note: for significant effects, the figures in the boxes denote the significance level. 
 
Outcomes over time 
We now move beyond the survival in the new unemployment spell and look at 
the programme impact on the probability of being in various states over time. 
Time is as usually measured in months, and t=0 for when the two groups be-
come (register as) unemployed again. 
Figure 5.21A is representative of the treatment effects in terms of various 
outcomes over time: having participated in a programme in their first unem-
ployment experience has given former participants no edge in exiting unem-
ployment, nor are they significantly more likely to experience (repeated) pro-
gramme participation than if they had never been on a programme before. There 
is no evidence whatsoever of any programme effect on employment rates, with 
the same applying to the other routes out of unemployment – being de-
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registered for other reasons, leaving the workforce or going on regular educa-
tion.  
While registered as unemployed, individuals can collect unemployment bene-
fits. Figure 5.21B shows that at entry into the new unemployment spell, former 
participants are over 10 percentage points more likely to be actually receiving 
benefits. This positive programme effect on benefit collection rates gradually 
dwindles, remaining significant up to the 10
th month in the new unemployment 
spell. Since we have matched on unemployment duration (thus on benefit ex-
haustion), as well as on employment duration (thus on benefit renewability 
through the work condition), the initial higher likelihood of collecting benefits 
by the treated can be explained by their former participation in the programme, 
which has given them an edge towards renewing their benefits. 
 
Figure 5.21  Treatment effect over time on  
(t months after entry into new unemployment spell) 
(A) various outcome probabilities ** 
t











(B) benefit collection probability 
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** Graphs virtually identical for probability of employment, of de-registration/employment, 
of unemployment, of programme participation, of non-participation, of regular education and 
of part-time unemployment. 
 
In conclusion, having participated in a programme gives no particular advan-
tage – nor disadvantage, it has to be said – in leaving unemployment should one 
fall back in it, the only really noticeable boon for former participants (from  72
their point of view, probably not from the evaluator’s one) being a short-lasting 
higher chance of collecting benefits at entry into the new unemployment spell. 
 
 
6.  Unemployment-programme cycling behaviour 
As described in Section 2, a feature which is quite distinctive of the Swedish 
institutional system is that labour market programmes are intricately tied in 
with the unemployment insurance system, since participation in such pro-
grammes qualifies for new periods of unemployment compensation.  
Thus while programmes may offer the possibility of enhancing the human 
capital of participants in principle, programmes as a fact serve as a vehicle to 
renew unemployment benefits, and could thus reinforce the work disincentive 
associated with the unemployment insurance system. 
After a brief review of the relevant Swedish literature, this section both 
draws all the previous evidence together and looks at some further clues, all of 
which point to cycling behaviour as the most likely ‘culprit’ for most of the 
disappointing programme effects uncovered. 
Previous Swedish evidence on the importance of issues relating to unem-
ployment benefits, work disincentive effects and cycling behaviour would seem 
to favour such an interpretation. Agell and Lundborg (1999) describe a micro-
simulation based on the benefit and tax regulations (including housing allow-
ances, social assistance and child care fees) in 1998, according to which 4% of 
the unemployed would actually gain nothing from finding employment, 38% 
would have a disposable income between 90 and 99% of their income if em-
ployed, and 36% would have a disposable income between 80 to 89% of their 
income in employment. Regnér (1997) provides some evidence that job-seekers 
may often have entered labour market training just to renew benefits; results by 
Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) based on a competing risks model 
show that UI-entitled individuals close to benefit exhaustion are significantly  73
more likely to exit their unemployment spell to a programme than those without 
unemployment compensation (cf. their Figure 3). They also uncover a UI work 
disincentive effect, though small in size. The small effect could partly be ac-
counted for by their type of data, which do not record actual compensation re-
ceived by the unemployed. In a subsequent study, Carling, Holmlund and Vejsin 
(1999) do in fact find a significant and large negative UI effect on job finding 
rates. Ackum Agell, Björklund and Harkman (1995) find that prolonged spells 
of benefit-programme periods are indeed common in Sweden, while Hägglund 
(2000) detects a very interesting sensitivity of employment duration as well as 
time spent on a programme to changes in the UI work requirement.  
To investigate cycling behaviour in our data explicitly, let us first propose a 
working definition of a cycle as a chain of at least four alternating unemploy-
ment (U) – programme (P) spells, in symbols UPUP(..UP..). The programme 
spell in bold denotes the first spell in the cycle. In concrete terms, we allow an 
individual to be unemployed, to interrupt this spell by joining a programme and 
to then resume it. However, if he then enters a new programme, then we con-
sider this his first spell in a cycle. Therefore a cycling programme spell is de-
fined as P preceded by UPU, and a cycling unemployment spell as U preceded 
by PUP.  
A compensated cycle is defined as a chain of the type described above, but 
where in each unemployment spell, including the one preceding the start of the 




Let us first of all give a rough idea of the quantitative importance of the phe-
nomenon, both in terms of individuals involved and in terms of cycle length, for 
the individuals in our sample. Almost one in two (42%) of our 32,000 treated 
start cycling (from the treatment), and for more than half of them this is a com-
pensated cycle. Over 1 in 3 of the compensated cycles has four or more 




c or longer (with one quarter of them being censored).  74
Let us move beyond this descriptive analysis to look at the causal treatment 
effect of joining a programme (versus waiting longer) on the probability to be 
on a compensated cycle. Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 show that programme 
participants have a rather high compensated cycling probability over time (8% 
on average over the 5-year horizon considered), which peaks around 15% and 
which still remains at 5% after 5 years from the start of the programme. What is 
however more interesting is to look at are the differential probabilities between 
participants and those who waited longer; the figure displays quite a sizeable 
treatment effect on the probability of being in an unemployment-benefit-
compensated cycle over time (over the observation period, participants are on 
average 3.5 percentage points more likely to be in the midst of a compensated 
cyle), an effect which persists well up to 50 months after entry into the 
programme. The figures for the treatment effect on general cycling behaviour 
are obviously even larger. 
 
Figure 6.1 Compensated cycle probability over time and corresponding treat-
ment effect 
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Table 6.1 Cycling and compensated cycling:  
Average probabilities and average treatment effects  
(over the 5-year horizon since the start of the programme) 
 
 Treated Controls Effect
Cycle 12.8 7.6 5.2
Compensated Cycle  8.1 4.7 3.5
 
Cycling itself may be considered a worrying phenomenon for a number of 
reasons; the fact that unemployed individuals keep going on various 
programmes withouth exiting unemployment is clear evidence of a failure of the 
programme system itself, while the importance of compensated cycling 
behaviour points to a likely failure in the way incentives are taken into account 
by the intertwined UI-programme policy system. Entitlement to unemployment 
compensation, with the related issues of benefit exhaustion and eligibility 
renewal through programme participation, may in fact be heavily involved in 
the above findings. We thus turn to analysing the linkages between entitlement 
and cycling behaviour. 
When we have looked at the determinants of programme participation by 
prior unemployment duration in Section 5.2.2, it was all too clear that entitled 
individuals have preferential access to programmes at and just after their bene-
fit exhaustion, being over 10 percentage points more likely to gain access to a 
programme than if they had not been entitled. Although this may be taken as an 
indication that joining a programme may often by done purely in order to es-
cape benefit exhaustion (in fact, during the 1990s those at risk of benefit ex-
haustion were guaranteed a place in a programme), on its own this would not 
account for the absence of positive programme effects. It may be that pro-
grammes do manage to teach individuals some new skills and good working 
habits, even though participants may initially have joined them out of the need 
to renew their eligibility to unemployment compensation. 
This possibility does not however seem to be supported by further evidence 
presented in previous sections: individuals entering a programme in their 14
th  76
month in unemployment (the month coinciding with benefit exhaustion) have 
been found to be that sub-group of the treated for whom the various programme 
effects have consistently been among the worst. The disappointing results in 
terms of the probability of employment, de-registration, studies or especially 
benefit receipt over time, as well as in terms of survival in unemployment could 
partly be explained by cycling behaviour.  
In particular, by far the worst treatment effect in terms of compensated cy-
cling probability is again displayed by those joining a programme in their 14
th 
month of unemployment (henceforth the 14-group): Figure 6.2A shows that for 
this group the average effect is an 8 percentage point higher probability of be-
ing in a compensated cycle over time, against an 1.8 higher probability for indi-
viduals joining a programme in their first month of unemployment and an aver-
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When looking at sub-groups of participants based on their month of 
placement (cf. Figure 6.2B), the 14-group again stands out as the one with the 
highest probability of becoming a cycler: 44% of the individuals joining a 
programme in their 14
th month of unemployment are observed in our data to 
start a compensated cycle (60% a general cycle), compared to around 15% (32%  77
for a general cycle) of those entering a programme early (within 3 months of 
open unemployment).  
Figure 6.3 contrasts the behaviour of the 14-group with that of individuals 
who are treated within a year of registration. The graphs plot the two groups’ 
probabilities of being on a programme over time, as well as the probability of 
being actually collecting unemployment benefits over time. Measurement starts 
at the beginning of the first programme (i.e. the treatment). 
 
Figure 6.3 Programme rates over time and benefit collection probability over 
time: 14-group versus 1-12 group 























As expected, programme rates steadily decline over time. However, while for 
the 1-12 group they keep declining up to 5 years after first receiving treatment, 
they visibly peak again after 20 months for the 14-group. This is very revealing: 
to renew benefits, participation needs to last at least 5 months, to this add an-
other 14 months as the maximum period of compensated unemployment, after 
which we are witnessing these individuals going back into programmes. More 
than one in four (26%) of the individuals in the 14-group is again on a pro-
gramme in their 21
st month, compared to 15% of the 1-12 group, and 13% for 
its 1-3 sub-group. The story is however not over yet; just add another 5 months 
spent on the programme starting from their 19
th month, another 14 months of  78
compensated unemployment, and it should come to no surprise that the 14-
group exhibits a further peak in participation probability at around the 38
th 
month (15% of them are on a programme, compared to 9% of the 1-12 group).  
That the spells of unemployment are likely to be supported by benefits is 
shown by the right-hand side graph of Figure 6.3. After the initial rise due to 
the exit from the programme back to unemployment, the probability of benefit 
collection steadily declines for the 1-12 group. For the 14-group the pattern of 
this indicator is quite different. After the end of the programme, that is after 
around 5 months, it skyrockets reaching almost 50% (compared to barely 25% 
for the earlier placement group). This means that after the treatment, half of the 
14-group individuals not only fall back into unemployment, but they receive 
unemployment compensation. Their probability of benefit collection then begins 
to fall, though not only does it remain significantly higher than the one for the 
other group over the whole observation period, but it also rises again in corre-
spondence of 25 months. If we allow 5 months on the treatment programme, an-
other 14 in compensated unemployment, another 5 in a further programme to 
renew eligibility, we arrive at the start of their 25
th month, from which time al-
most one third of the original 14-group participants is again claiming benefits. 
Once again, the story continues, with another hump in correspondence of 14 
months of compensated unemployment, after which the benefit receipt probabil-
ity drops, only to start rising again after 5 months. 
Thus far we have seen that starting a cycle from the first treatment is far 
from uncommon, and that this applies in particular to those who enrol into pro-
grammes in their 14
th month in unemployment, a period suspiciously coinciding 
with unemployment compensation exhaustion. The supposition that these indi-
viduals may just view the programme as a passport to renew benefit entitlement 
is supported by the finding that the main treatment effect is a stronger incentive 
to keep switching between compensated unemployment spells and subsequent 
programme participation.  79
Further evidence that entitlement (renewability) considerations may be a 
weighty driving force behind incentives to participate and thus behind the ob-
served programme effects can be gleaned by examining the survival in a cycle 
by entitlement status. In Figure 6.4, entitlement status is determined by receiv-
ing actual compensation in their 2
nd unemployment spell, the one just before en-
tering a new programme and thus beginning a cycle (i.e. UPUP…). 
 
Figure 6.4 Survival function in a cycle (days), by entitlement status 
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Test for equality of survivor functions: 
Pr>chi2 = 0.0000. 
 
 
(B) Compensated cycle 
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est for equality of survivor functions:  
Pr>chi2 = 0.0000. 
 
UI-entitled participants survive significantly (both statistically and literally) 
longer in a cycle than KAS-entitled or non entitled treated. After having been 
treated and having resumed their interrupted unemployment spell, individuals 
who still have (some) unemployment insurance benefit left and enter a new pro-
gramme are expected to alternate between unemployment and programme par-
ticipation for 654 days, 20% longer than KAS-entitled cyclers (512 days) and 
35% longer than non-entitled cyclers (483 days). Focusing on the subset of fully 
compensated cycles, UI-entitled individuals have an expected survival of 287 
KAS 
UI 
none  KAS 
UI  80
days against 241 days for KAS recipients, again confirming the ranking of the 
durations on the basis of the strength of the incentives provided by UI and by 
KAS (as mentioned in Section 2, the latter pays out on average around half of 
the cash benefits provided by the former, and for only half of the period). 
Another way of looking at entitlement and cycles is to consider the duration 
of compensated unemployment spells within cycles by entitlement status. Figure 
6.5 shows that not only UI-compensated unemployment spells in cycles last on 
average significantly longer than KAS-compensated ones, but that there is an 
unmistakable clustering in correspondence of the maximum duration of benefits 
for both types of entitlement: at 210 days for KAS and at 420 days (and 630 
days; for over 55 claimants) for UI. 
 
Figure 6.5 Density distribution of the duration of compensated unemployment 
spells within cycles (days), by entitlement status 
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Up to now we have examined the cycling behaviour of individuals who have 
started a cycle from the treatment itself. A final piece of evidence relates to the 
outcomes experienced by individuals who have not started a cycle from their 
first programme.  
In fact, while we have seen that the various treatment effects have been 
among the worst for those joining a programme at the time of benefit exhaus-
UI 
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tion, when in Section 5.3 we have looked at the performance of individuals who 
have been observed not to start cycling from the treatment, our results have 
shown that participation in a programme does not seem to have harmed the non-
first-time cyclers, though it has been impossible to detect any benefit they may 
have derived from it. 
Let us thus focus on those treated individuals who have not started cycling 
after having participated in a programme, but have instead exited their inter-
rupted unemployment spell for a job, and consider the potential programme ef-
fect on cycling for the specific sub-samples of individuals of Sections 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2, that is for  
(A)  individuals who have found a job – some on their own (UE individuals), 
some after having experienced a programme (UP(U)E individuals) – without 
starting a cycle (i.e. without going on a second programme); 
(B) the sub-set of them who have fallen back into unemployment after having 
found a job (i.e. UEU and UP(U)EU individuals). 
Figure 6.6 – which should be contrasted to Figure 6.1 – shows that pro-
grammes keep having no effect on these individuals: former participants are 
hardly ever (both statistically and in terms of the effect size) more likely to be 
on a cycle (after having registered again) than comparable non treated. How to 
view such a result is largely a matter of interpretation. A favourable stance to-
wards the programmes may tend towards viewing former participants as no 
more likely to be on a cycle than if they had not participated. It has however to 
be kept in mind that the participants we are now looking at have been selected 
among those who did not start a cycle from their first treatment. In addition, 
what can safely be stated is that the programme effect on the cycling probability 
is certainly not a negative one, i.e. programmes do not discourage former par-
ticipants to start cycling in the future. 
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Figure 6.6 Compensated cycle probability over time and corresponding treat-
ment effect, non-first-time cyclers 
(A) UP(U)E versus UE  
(t months after entry into employment) 
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(B) UP(U)EU versus UEU  
(t months after entry into new unemployment) 
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7. Conclusions   
It is felt that the most important issue in evaluating the Swedish programmes 
concerns the co-ordination and interaction between the two components of the 
labour market policy in Sweden – labour market programmes and the unem-
ployment insurance system.  83
On the one hand, labour market programmes do offer the possibility of re-
maining out of work for a possibly indefinite period of time under very gener-
ous terms, thus reinforcing the work disincentive associated with the generous 
unemployment insurance system. Several mechanisms may contribute to weaken 
the incentives to escape unemployment, such as a higher reservation wage, a 
lower search intensity or a lower geographical mobility. On the other hand, la-
bour market programmes may offer the possibility of investment in several di-
mensions of human capital; if this second component is sufficiently strong, the 
possibilities on the labour market, including the earnings on the job, may be-
come high enough to outweigh the work disincentives created by the system.  
What has to be noticed, however, is that while the first component is a fact – 
programmes do allow to renew benefits, and until 1996 they even allowed to 
become eligible for the first time –, the mere existence of the second one is a 
supposition, though a widely held one. Object of the present analysis is in fact 
to evaluate the presence and strength of this human capital-enhancing compo-
nent of the programmes. In particular, in the Swedish institutional set-up any 
potential productivity-enhancing components of the programmes would have to 
fiercely compete with the cycling incentives to be able display any positive ef-
fects. 
The findings from our analyses can be broadly grouped into two main sets. 
The first set of results (Section 5.2) relates to how programme participants 
perform from the treatment compared to a hypothetical state where they would 
have waited longer in open unemployment. We had to conclude that, on aver-
age, joining a programme keeps participants longer in the current unemploy-
ment spell than if they had waited, and that these individuals are expected to 
experience a lower probability of being out of the official unemployment system 
over time, as well as a higher probability of benefit collection and of being in a 
compensated unemployment-programme cycle for at least up to five years from 
the start of the treatment, than do comparable individuals who have not joined a 
programme at least up to when participants did. A possible explanation for all  84
these effects is the reinforced work disincentive associated with the entitlement 
renewability that participation allows. On the other hand we also found evi-
dence of a positive treatment effect on employment rates, which would seem to 
be quite robust to the misclassification problem of the ‘lost’ individuals.
65 Such 
an impact seems to derive from a greatly reduced likelihood of unregistered un-
employment over time. Under some simplifying assumptions, joining a pro-
gramme compared to waiting longer would thus ‘swap’ uncompensated, unregis-
tered unemployment not only for unemployment-benefit compensated (and thus 
registered) unemployment as well as for further programme participation, but 
also for employment in the regular labour market.  
Nevertheless, various pieces of evidence have consistently hinted at a con-
siderable role of entitlement and its renewability behind the incentives to par-
ticipate. Entitled individuals have an (over 10 percentage points) preferential 
access to programmes at and just after their benefit exhaustion than if they had 
not been entitled, so that entering a programme appears to be often done purely 
in order to escape benefit exhaustion. While this tells us nothing about the pos-
sibility of a human capital-enhancing effect of the programmes, the first set of 
results show that for individuals entering a programme around benefit exhaus-
tion the various programme effects are among the worst than for any other 
group of treated. From such results it would seem that the human capital-
enhancing component of the programmes may not in general be strong enough 
to always outcompete the work disincentives provided by the system. 
The second sets of results – Section 5.3 – looks at outcomes for sub-groups 
of former participants selected on the basis of their observed performance after 
the treatment. When looking at the performance of individuals who have been 
observed not to start cycling from the treatment, programme participation ap-
pears to be practically irrelevant for their subsequent labour market perform-
                                                 
65 A proper classification of the ‘lost’ individuals is important also when looking at pro-
gramme effects conditional on past outcomes, since they too should ideally enter in the de-
termination of the sub-populations considered; in the present analyses of Section 5.3 these 
individuals are ignored.  85
ance. While participation has not harmed these non-1
st-time cyclers, it does not 
seem to help those participants who have managed to find a job to retain it 
longer, and nor does it give former participants fallen back into unemployment 
any kind of particular advantage in dealing with their new unemployment ex-
perience. The set of findings that when cycling has been ruled out by construc-
tion, programmes have no effect on any of the outcomes considered would actu-
ally point towards an absence of human capital-enhancing components in the 
programmes taken by this subset of individuals. 
Before being able to make a more conclusive judgement, though, in addition 
to the misclassification problem of the ‘lost’ individuals at least three other im-
portant issues would require further investigation. 
We have considered a number of interesting outcomes, all represented by la-
bour market states individuals may find themselves in (e.g. unemployment, em-
ployment, regular education, non-participation etc.). However we had no infor-
mation on post-programme earnings or wages – an important measure of poten-
tial programme effects on individual productivity, which would allow a more 
complete picture of the comparative performance of former participants who 
have found a job.  
Secondly, the present analysis has looked at the programme-benefit system in 
its entirety, lumping all kinds of programmes into an anonymous ‘treatment’. 
Overall, the system may not be seen as fulfilling its aim. A possibility to be ex-
plored in further work is to adequately take account of an institutional environ-
ment where individuals can potentially participate in a wide array of different 
types of programmes. Different treatments may in fact have heterogeneous ef-
fects. Thus while some programmes may simply lock participants in rather use-
less and low-qualified tasks, others may indeed endow individuals with market-
able transferable skills, whose return on the labour market may turn out to be 
large enough to outweigh the work disincentives created by the system. A mul-
tiple-treatment analysis would thus aim at identifying the best-performing pro-
grammes.   86
Finally, the results obtained in this paper rely on a non-parametric technique 
which assumes selection on observables. Despite the richness of the available 
dataset, the discussion in Section 5.2.2 has highlighted some potentially remain-
ing sources of bias. Future work should assess the robustness of such results to 
the assumptions needed by an alternative approach aimed at identifying a struc-
tural econometric model. Such an approach would explicitly model the sequence 
of choices facing individuals and take into account the endogeneity of the selec-
tion of unemployed workers to specific programmes, which are intertwined with 
unemployment benefits eligibility and renewability.   87
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Appendix  
This appendix provides additional information on matching for the three main 
types of matching analyses performed. 
1. MATCHING FOR JOINING VERSUS WAITING 
Matching Protocol 
I)  The following procedure is repeated for each month up to one and a half 
year since registration (i.e. m=1,2, … 18): 
1.  The relevant units are selected: all those treated who enter a programme 
within their m
th month in unemployment and all those non-treated who 
are still unemployed after m months since first registering at the em-
ployment office. 
2.  The propensity score e(X;m) ≡  Pr{D
m=1 | X, T
0≥ m} is estimated on the 
two sub-groups, giving an estimate of the conditional probability of join-
ing a programme in the m
th month of unemployment.  
3. This sub-group of participants is matched to the corresponding sub-
group of (at least yet) non-participants by nearest-neighbour with re-
placement within caliper δ ; treated unit i is matched to that non-treated 
unit j such that: 
δ >−= −
∈=
e X me X m e X me X m ij
kD
ik m ( ,) ( ,) m i n { | ( ,) ( ,) | }
{} 0
. 
4. The differential performance of the sub-group of treated and the sub-
group of matched comparisons is used to calculate the effect of entering 
a programme after m months versus waiting longer. 
II) All  the  M=18 the results by month of entry are finally aggregated to obtain 
the average expected effect of joining in a given month of unemployment 
compared to waiting longer, where the average is taken with respect to the 
observed joining distribution (i.e. the T
1 distribution) of the treated. 
 





















Treated and potential controls by time in unemployment  
Month Treated  Non-Treated Month Treated Non-Treated 
1 4,141  99,992 10 982 21,417 
2 4,004  85,377 11 861 19,047 
3 4,739  68,669 12 747 17,115 
4 3,665  53,478 13 823 15,093 
5 2,602  43,976 14 968 13,247 
6 1,922  37,283 15 852 11,474 
7 1,689  32,101 16 672 10,064 
8 1,367  27,494 17 501 8,938 
9 1,140  24,159 18 384 7,998 
 
treated     =   31,975 
matched controls   =  21,999 
Total number of times a control is used (%) 
1  70.1      8,070 treated individuals (25%) are previously 
2    20.0    used  as  controls. 
3     6.3  
≥ 4    3.6 
 
Mean and percentiles of difference in linear prediction between treated and 
matched controls                                                   
Mean 0.00037     
25% 0.00001     
50% 0.00002     
75% 0.00007    Support of the linear   Min -3.54066 
95% 0.00056    prediction  Max 0.99597 
 
Duration distribution of the (interrupted) first unemployment spell for 
treated and matched controls 
 
days
 treated  controls







2. MATCHING CONDITIONAL ON HAVING FOUND EMPLOYMENT 
treated     =   10,351 
matched controls   =    7,049 
Imbalance of the most important covariates: 
Means in the two groups and standardised differences (%) 
 Treated Matched  Con-
trols 
% bias
Age at entry   29.47 29.78  -2.91
Gender female)   47.66 47.51  0.29
Foreign   12.88 13.56  -2.03
Education    
   compulsory  15.39 16.69  -3.55
   upper secondary  13.95 13.15  2.34
   vocational upper secondary  54.62 54.50  0.25
   university  16.04 15.66  1.03
Education for job sought (yes)  65.43 65.81  -0.79
Experience for job sought    
   some  24.13 24.06  0.18
   good  43.32 44.17  -1.71
Missing information   2.78 2.68  0.65
Entitlement status    
   UI  38.06 40.44  -4.87
   KAS  5.69 5.90  -0.91
County    
   Stockholm  17.06 16.35  1.92
   Göteborg and Bohus   15.99 16.54  -1.49
   Malmöhus  12.50 12.42  0.23
Sector    
   professional and technical work   14.39 14.92  -1.48
   health, nursing and social work  12.62 13.31  -2.07
   administrative, managerial and clerical work  14.60 14.08  1.49
   sales  12.81 13.31  -1.49
   production  23.69 23.42  0.64
   services  8.86 8.13  2.60
Part-time   3.41 3.66  -1.36
Interlocal 18.37 17.93  1.13
Month of registration   6.22 6.27  -1.62
   January   10.70 11.27  -1.82
   June   17.20 16.01  3.19
   August   12.92 12.85  0.20
First register as part-time unemployed   5.10 6.11  -4.37
Part-time unemployment   18.24 20.18  -4.93
Type of unemployed    
   able to take a job immediately  91.25 90.31  3.24
   offered a labour market programme   5.06 3.85  5.85
   need guidance   15.37 16.41  -2.85
Unemployment duration  266.19 278.86  -4.53 94
Type of employment    
   recalled  9.74 9.24  1.71
   temporary  40.58 39.31  2.58
   registered  36.24 34.39  3.86
Propensity score  -0.4199 -0.4209  0.14
Average absolute standardised difference    2.02
Median absolute standardised difference    1.67
Number of observations  10,351 10,351 
 
Total number of times a control is used (%) 
1 72.7 
2   20.0 
3     5.3  
≥ 4    2.0 
 
Mean and percentiles of difference in linear prediction between treated and 
matched controls                                                   
Mean 0.00155    
25% 0.00000    
50% 0.00003    
75% 0.00010   Support of the linear   Min -3.06122 
95% 0.00138   prediction  Max 3.08517 
 
Total unemployment duration distribution for treated and matched controls 
total time in U
 treated  controls







Heterogeneous treatment effects 
  Expected employ-
ment duration 
Effect 
  Treated Controls  Days  Significance 
Gender       
- males  896 900 -4 .91 
- females  677 709 -32 .17 
Entitlement   
- ui  870 875 -5 .77 
- kas  851 805 46 .62 
- none  731 738 -7 .77 
Age   
- 18-20  564 623 -59 .01 
- 20-25  740 726 14 .33 
- 25-35  909 899 10 .70 
- 35-54  896 915 -19 .74 
Citizenship       
- Swedish  789 818 -29 .11 
- foreign  812 772 40 .34 
Human Capital    
- low  760 741 19 .36 
- secondary  739 755 -16 .66 
- university  1,031 1,049 -18 .67 
- no experience  726 726 0 .85 
- a lot exper.  894 897 -3 .999 
- univ & lot exper  1,090 1,137 -47 .36 
- low & no exper  704 668 36 .94 
Time in Unempl.   
- before joining    
≤ 90  752 792 -40 .11 
180-270 760 746 14 .50 
400-500 752 701 51 .07   
- complete    
≤ 90  752 804 -52 .87 
180-270 724 766 -42 .21 




10 932 913 19 .55 
20 919 889 30 .30 
30 879 792 87 .01 
40 742 752 -10 .86 
50 806 764 42 .30 
60 702 765 -63 .06 
70 715 747 -32 .31 
80 677 727 -50 .06 
90 676 746 -70 .08 
100 621 697 -76 .44  96
3. MATCHING CONDITIONAL ON HAVING FALLEN BACK INTO UNEMPLOYMENT  
 
treated     =   6,021 
matched controls   =  4,052 
Imbalance of the most important covariates: 
Means in the two groups and standardised differences (%) 
 Treated Matched  Con-
trols 
% bias
Age at entry   28.93 29.15  -2.03
Gender female)   50.52 50.76  -0.47
Foreign   12.49 13.25  -2.28
Education    
   compulsory  16.08 16.81  -1.97
   upper secondary  14.65 15.01  -1.03
   vocational upper secondary  55.94 54.18  3.54
   university  13.34 14.00  -1.93
Education for job sought (yes)  63.58 62.48  2.27
Experience for job sought    
   some  25.24 25.63  -0.88
   good  41.69 41.37  0.64
Missing information   2.92 2.41  3.20
Entitlement status    
   UI  37.44 38.40  -1.99
   KAS  5.45 6.58  -4.75
County    
   Stockholm  15.38 14.38  2.80
   Göteborg and Bohus   15.55 15.60  -0.14
   Malmöhus  12.41 12.52  -0.35
Sector    
   professional and technical work   12.59 12.34  0.75
   health, nursing and social work  14.20 15.50  -3.64
   administrative, managerial and clerical work  12.72 12.27  1.36
   sales  12.72 12.81  -0.25
   production  24.07 24.58  -1.20
   services  9.85 9.90  -0.17
Part-time   3.44 4.17  -3.82
Interlocal 17.72 17.16  1.49
Month of registration   6.19 6.27  -2.44
   January   10.60 11.24  -2.08
   June   18.45 16.72  4.54
   August   13.40 13.60  -0.58
First register as part-time unemployed   4.87 5.90  -4.56
Part-time unemployment   18.24 20.46  -5.64
Type of unemployed    
   able to take a job immediately  92.06 91.00  3.82
   offered a labour market programme   4.98 4.14  4.06 97
   need guidance   14.53 14.83  -0.84
Unemployment duration  256.77 264.94  -3.23
Type of employment    
   recalled  7.39 7.17  0.83
   temporary  47.82 46.47  2.70
   registered  41.55 40.01  3.14
Employment duration  273.24 267.81  1.62
Propensity score  -0.3987 -0.4002  0.21
Average absolute standardised difference    2.16
Median absolute standardised difference    2.03
Number of observations  6,021 6,021 
 
Total number of times a control is used (%) 
1 72.8 
2   16.9 
3     5.5  
≥ 4    4.8 
 
Mean and percentiles of difference in linear prediction between treated and 
matched controls                                                   
Mean 0.00215    
25% 0.00002    
50% 0.00006    
75% 0.00019   Support of the linear   Min -3.0079 
95% 0.00222   prediction  Max 3.0121 
 
(A) Total unemployment and (B) employment duration distributions for 
treated and matched controls 
A 
total time in U
 treated  controls








 treated  controls







Heterogeneous treatment effects 
  Expected employ-
ment duration 
Effect 
  Treated Controls  Days  Significance 
Gender       
- males  260 257 3 .43 
- females  293 304 -11 .35 
Age (at re-entry into unempl.)   
- under 25  212 214 -2 .72 
- over 25  331 338 -7 .83 
Citizenship       
- Swedish  267 268 -1 .54 
- foreign  345 376 -31 .14 
Human Capital    
- low  341 360 -19 .96 




10 294 274 20 .04 
20 256 232 24 .23 
30 241 226 15 .72 
40 211 257 -46 .63 
50 260 255 5 .92 
60 267 260 7 .00 
70 275 269 6 .89 
80 326 321 5 .59 
90 309 333 -24 .10 
100 302 363 -61 .02 
 
 
 